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Abstract
This dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the medium of exchange in
corporate takeovers. Previous theoretical works and empirical evidence suggest three
distinct (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) elements o f information asymmetry: the
bidder's value, the target's value, and the synergy from a takeover. Chapter two of this
dissertation integrates the theory o f financial intermediation into the research o f the
medium of exchange in takeovers. The research question is how the bidders with
favorable information employ financial intermediaries, such as accounting firms,
investment banks, and commercial banks, to reduce the market's unfavorable reaction to
announcements of equity-financed takeovers. Chapter three examines whether the
method of payment conveys information about the value of the target firms. Chapter
four analyzes the information content of changes in payment terms in the takeover
process.
Results in chapter two indicate that the existence of high-quality financial
intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, of bidders reduces the market's
unfavorable reaction to announcements of equity-financed takeovers, hi stock offers, the
bidders' announcement excess returns are a positive function of bidders' commercial
banking relationship. The evidence on accounting firms and investment banks is not
found.
Evidence in chapter three does not support the notion that the method of
payment in takeovers conveys information about the value of the target companies.
vii
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Revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings for the target firms at announcements of
tender offers involving stock as the method of payment are similar to those at
announcements of cash tender offers. This suggests that if there is any information
revealed by the medium o f exchange in takeovers, the information is unlikely to be about
the value of the targets.
Results in chapter four are consistent with the notion that changes in the medium
of exchange in takeovers reveal information about the value of the bidders. After
controlling for changes in the takeover premium which accompany the revisions of
payment terms, bidders' announcement excess returns are approximately two percent
lower for increases in the stock component than for increases in the cash component.
Taken together, the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that the medium of
exchange in takeovers conveys information about the bidders' value rather than the
targets' value.

viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions combine the resources o f two separate corporate
entities. The bidder can choose from cash, stock or a combination of both as the method
of payment Over the past few years, several papers have provided hypotheses to
explain the motivation behind the choice o f medium of exchange in corporate takeovers.
Two of the strongest involve the revelation o f private managerial information and
consideration of the tax consequences o f the acquisition. Extant literature (Travlos,
1987, Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987, and Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992) reports that the
use of stock to finance a takeover conveys unfavorable information about the value of
the bidder because the market views that the bidder managers, acting in the best interests
of shareholders, would not issue equity unless these managers believe the bidder's
common shares to be overvalued in the market. The information theories on the medium
of exchange in takeovers are not confined to whether the medium of exchange conveys
information about the bidder's value. Several theoretical works have centered on
elements other than the bidder's value as the focus of information asymmetry. For
example, Fishman (1989) theorizes that the method of payment in takeovers conveys
information about the synergy from a takeover. Hansen (1987) provides a model where
the information advantage possessed by the bidder and the target about the value of their
own firms determines the choice of the medium of exchange in a takeover.

1
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2
Secondly, there are tax considerations associated with the method o f payment in
takeovers (Carleton, Guilkey, Harris, and Stewart, 1983, Wansley, Lane, and Yang,
1983, and Huang and Walkling, 1987). A cash takeover creates an immediate capital
gains tax for shareholders o f the target firms, while an equity-financed acquisition defers
the tax payment until the new shares are sold.
This dissertation provides a detailed empirical analysis o f information theories on
the medium of exchange in takeovers. Chapter two integrates the theory o f financial
intermediation into the takeover research. The question addressed is how the bidders
with favorable information utilize financial intermediaries to reduce the market's
unfavorable reactions to announcements o f equity-financed takeovers. For example, a
bidder might decide to use common shares to finance a takeover because o f requests by
the target's shareholders (because of tax consideration discussed above) rather than
bidder managerial beliefthat the bidder's shares are overvalued. Thus, bidders with
favorable information in stock offers have an incentive to differentiate themselves from
those with unfavorable information in stock offers. The theory of financial
intermediation calls for the use of high-quality financial intermediaries to certify highquality bidders in stock offers. The empirical results, particularly those on commercial
banks, are generally consistent with this view.
Chapter three examines whether the method of payment in takeovers conveys
information about the value o f the target's common shares. Previous studies analyze the
stock returns of the target. When using this stock return approach, however, it is
difficult to examine whether the method o f payment reflects the value o f the target
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3
because target's announcement excess returns combine any information effects with the
tax effects (as above) associated with the medium of exchange. Thus, chapter three
analyzes whether the revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings for the targets depend on
the method of payment Analysts' reactions to announcements o f tender offers involving
stock as the medium of exchange are found to be similar to those to announcements of
cash tender offers. Thus, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the method
of payment conveys information about the value of target's assets.
Chapter four analyzes changes in the medium of exchange in the takeover
process. The research question is whether the decision to alter the medium of exchange
in takeovers conveys information about the value of the bidders. The results indicate
that, after controlling for changes in takeover premium which accompany revisions of the
medium of exchange, bidders' announcement excess returns are approximately two
percent lower for increases in the stock component than for increases in the cash
component. Thus, changes in payment terms in takeovers reveal information about the
value of the bidders.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that the choice of the medium of exchange
in takeovers reflects the value o f the bidders rather than the targets. Furthermore,
financial intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, monitor and certify the bidder's
decision to issue common shares to finance mergers and acquisitions. The higher the
bidder's commercial banking relationship, the more favorable the market's reaction to an
announcement of a stock offer.
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Chapter 2
Information Asymmetries, Certification, and Monitoring
2.1. Introduction
Studies of the medium o f exchange in takeovers have provided two major
explanations why managers of bidding companies choose equity or cash to finance
acquisitions: ( 1) target shareholders' tax consequences associated with the choice of
payment method to finance takeovers, and (2 ) private information about the value of the
firms involved in takeovers. Recent studies on financial intermediaries argue that
intermediaries mitigate similar problems arising from corporate insiders' private
information about firm value. The integration of this area of research into takeovers,
however, is largely unexplored.
This paper integrates the theory of financial intermediation into the takeover
research by examining whether the presence of high-quality financial intermediaries
reduces the information problems associated with stock financing in takeovers. This
paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze how the market uses the choice of
financial intermediaries to alter the valuation of the firm upon announcements of equityfinanced investment projects, including takeovers. The model shows that the value of
external monitoring in stock offers should exceed that in cash offers. This study also
provides further empirical evidence consistent with the view that the presence of
recognized and reputable outside monitors, particularly commercial banks, reduces the
adverse selection problem associated with the use of common shares to finance
4
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investment projects. The share price reactions to announcements o f stock offers are
found to be a positive function of the bidders' commercial banking relationship.
Furthermore, the value o f external monitoring generated by commercial banks is
concentrated in takeovers that are financed by common shares. The results on
investment banks and auditors are considerably weaker. These findings are robust with
respect to specifications of bidders' announcement excess returns, and inclusion of
previously tested variables relating to characteristics o f takeovers and seasoned equity
offerings.
The remainder o f this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related
extant literature. Section 2.3 sets out a theoretical analysis and hypotheses. Sections 2.4
and 2.5 discuss the method of empirical analysis and data collection. Section 2.6
presents empirical results. Concluding remarks are presented in section 2.7.
2.2. Takeovers, medium of exchange, and financial intermediation
2.2.1. Mergers and acquisitions
Corporate takeovers are frequently viewed as an arena in which managerial teams
compete for the rights to manage corporate resources, hi their review of the literature
on mergers and acquisitions, Jensen and Ruback (1983) conclude that corporate
takeovers generate positive value gains, that target shareholders benefit, and that bidder
shareholders do not lose, hi addition, the gains created by takeovers, on average, do not
appear to come from the creation of market power. The two most likely sources of
gains to bidders are synergy and undervalued targets. Bidders, however, can be
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motivated to acquire a target for reasons not related to either synergy or the target's
undervaluation.
The key question is how to explain the value gains from mergers and
acquisitions. Bradley (1980) studies the stock price behavior around interfirm tender
offers and concludes that synergy is the dominant source of value gains. He views the
tender offer as a bid for the right to manage the resources of the target firm in a
competitive market for corporate control. Bradley argues that corporate "raiding" (i.e.
the bidder profiting from purchasing a majority of the target firm's assets at a price that is
lower than their intrinsic value) is not an important explanation for interfirm tender offers
because the post-execution (referring to the tender offer per se) market price of the
target’s shares is significantly higher than its pre-announcement level. If corporate
"raiding" were an important explanation for interfirm tender offers, the market price of
the target share subsequent to a successful tender-offer would be lower than its preannouncement level. Bradley also finds that the shareholders of successful acquiring
firms realize a capital gain as a result o f the acquisition of the target’s shares. These
gains, however, are not realized through the market appreciation in the purchased target
shares. While the post-execution market price of the target shares is significantly higher
than its pre-announcement level, the post-execution price is significantly less than the
share price paid by the acquiring firm. The fact that the acquisition of the target shares
(which is a financial loss on paper) is a positive net-present-value investment suggests
that the value of the control of the target shares stems not from these shares'
proportional claims to the target's net cash flows but rather from the reallocation of the
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target's resources. Thus, Bradley interprets these results as consistent with a synergy
interpretation o f interfirm tender offers.
The other possible motive for mergers and acquisitions is that managers of
bidding firms have private information about the targets' intrinsic value that is not
impounded in the targets' share prices. Although previous studies suggest that the
private-information hypothesis is unlikely to folly explain the magnitude of value gains
from takeovers, this hypothesis cannot be ruled out. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983)
analyze successful versus unsuccessful interfirm tender offers. The results indicate that
the permanent positive revaluation of the target shares following unsuccessful bids is due
primarily to the emergence of or the expectation of another bid that would ultimately
lead to the transfer of control of the targets' resources. The rejection of a tender offer is
found to have differential effects on the share prices of unsuccessful bidders, depending
on whether the tender offers result in an ultimate change in the control of the targets'
resources. It is concluded that tender offers are attempts by bidders to exploit potential
synergies, not merely private information about the targets1 intrinsic value.
Bhagat, Brickley, and Loewenstein (1987) use option pricing theory to analyze
interfirm cash tender offers and also find that the information hypothesis is insufficient to
explain the magnitude o f value gains from cash tender offers. Bhagat, Brickley, and
Loewenstein view target shareholders as holding a put option on the target's shares
during the post-announcement but pre-expiration period (tender period). The observed
target's market share prices are for a portfolio consisting of the underlying stock and the
put option. The target's underlying (not observed) stock price subsequent to the tender
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offer announcement is calculated by using an option pricing model and found to be
significantly higher than the pre-announcement stock price. Thus, the put option is an
important component of the announcement-period return. These results suggest that the
bidder and target have synergies that allow the bidder to make a bid that is substantially
higher than the pre-announcement target's stock price.
On the other hand, Brous and Kini (1993) continue the argument that a takeover
announcement conveys information about the target's intrinsic value. They examine
analysts' earnings forecasts for a sample of takeover targets and report that the
announcement-month earnings forecasts are systematically revised upward. This
suggests that a takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the value of
the target firms. In addition, excess forecast revisions are significantly higher for targets
with low Tobin's 9 -ratios than for targets with high 9 -ratios, lending further support to
the signaling hypothesis (assuming that the lower the 9 -ratio of a firm, the more likely
the firm is undervalued in the market).
Alternatively, managers of acquiring firms could merely seek prestige and
monetary rewards associated with managing a large corporation, regardless of whether
the acquisitions are value-enhancing for shareholders. Roll (1986) argues that managers
of acquiring companies over-estimate their abilities to manage the target firms.
Consequently, bidders acquire the target firms by paying a price that is more than the
targets' actual worth to the acquiring firms. In addition, Jensen (1986) also contends that
managers who have little ownership of the firm have incentives to invest in projects that
benefit themselves.
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2.2.2. Medium of exchange in takeovers
2.2.2.I. Tax effects
A cash takeover creates an immediate liability for capital gains tax for
shareholders o f target companies, while an equity-financed acquisition defers taxes until
the new shares are sold. Carleton et a l (1983), Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983), and
Huang and Walkling (1987) argue that this tax effect predicts a larger takeover premium
for cash acquisitions than for acquisitions that use equity for payment. Bidders are
willing to pay the higher cash price because the cash payment allows the acquiring firms
to "write up" the tax bases o f some of the acquired assets when their fair market value
exceeds book value. This would result in higher depreciation expenses and, thus, higher
after-tax cash flows for the acquiring firms.
Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983) examine the differences in returns to target
firms after controlling for both merger type and method of payment, and report evidence
consistent with the tax effect. They find that shareholders o f target firms in cash
transactions earn, on average, 33.54 percent excess returns from 40 days prior to the
original takeover announcement through the announcement day. This number is almost
twice the excess return (17.47 percent) earned by shareholders of target firms when the
takeovers are financed by equity. Wansley, Lane, and Yang attribute this return
difference to three factors: ( 1 ) a tax effect that requires a larger takeover premium for
cash transactions than for securities-financed ones to compensate target company
shareholders for capital gains tax burdens; (2 ) regulatory requirements that favor cash as
the medium of exchange (because, unlike cash acquisitions, securities-financed bids must
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have a registration statement approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission);
and (3) the increasing popularity of cash takeovers during a period o f generally higher
takeover premiums.
Huang and Walkling (1987) provide further evidence supportive o f this tax
effect. Huang and Walkling avoid expost selection and classification bias by focusing on
the original rather than subsequent announcements. They also control for the
interdependence of payment method, acquisition type (Le. tender offer or merger), and
target's managerial resistance. After controlling for acquisition type and managerial
resistance, Haung and Walkling still find that announcement excess returns earned by
target firms in cash offers are significantly higher than those in stock offers. The results
lend additional and strong credence to the tax hypothesis.
Other empirical evidence on tax effects (particularly, on the bidder's side) is less
clear. For example, Carleton et at. (1983) report that "lower dividend payout ratios and
lower market-to-book ratios increase the probability o f being acquired in a cash takeover
relative to being acquired via an exchange o f securities" (p. 825). They further argue
that the association of a high market-to-book ratio with the security payment partially
supports the tax effect argument because market-to-book ratios approximate the level of
capital gains liabilities o f target company shareholders. That is, the higher the market-tobook ratio, the higher the potential capital gains liabilities, and, thus, the more
advantageous are equity securities for payment. On the other hand, this finding is
inconsistent with another aspect of the tax effect in that a high market-to-book ratio also
represents a potential large tax saving to the bidder arising from the write-up of target
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assets to their fair market values. Auerbach and Reishus (1988) use three different
measures for the potential tax benefits o f the write-up of acquired assets, and report that
none o f the measures are statistically significant or important in explaining the choice of
the method o f payment in takeover bids.
2.2J2.2. Information asymmetries
Myers and Majluf(1984) address the information asymmetry between the firm's
managers and outside investors over the value of the firm's shares. Myers and Majluf
claim that the market believes that managers, acting in the best interests of shareholders,
will not issue equity unless they view the shares o f their firms to be overvalued in the
market. Thus, in a takeover, the market would interpret the use of the acquirer’s shares
to finance takeovers as unfavorable information about the value of those shares, while
the use of cash signals positive information.
Fishman (1987) assumes that both the bidder and the target have private
information about the valuation of the target (operated as part of the bidder).
Additionally, there exists a cost of collecting information about the valuation for the
target, and there are two potential bidders for a target, implying that a takeover offer will
bring forth potential competition for the target. Under these settings, when the bidder
has information that the target has a high valuation, the bidder will use cash to pre-empt
a competing bid. (The pre-empting role o f cash arises from the assumption that a
competing bidder's expected payofffrom the takeover is decreasing in the initial bidder's
valuation for the target.) When the bidder's information about the valuation for the
target is less optimistic, the bidder will use equity as the payment method to solicit the
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private information possessed by the target (about the valuation for the target operated
as part of the bidder).
Hansen (1987) emphasizes the importance o f information asymmetry between the
target's managers and outside investors about the value of the target's assets. In
Hansen's theory, when the target firm has private information that the acquirer does not
have about the target's value, for every cash offer that is acceptable (i.e. wealth
increasing) to the acquirer, there exists a stock offer that dominates that cash offer. That
is, the expected wealth o f the stock offer exceeds that o f the cash offer. Thus, bidder's
managers prefer stock to cash as the payment method in order to mitigate the adverse
selection problem arising from the target's managers having superior information about
the value of target's assets.
A non-trivial question is why do we observe any cash offers ? Hansen reconciles
his theory with this empirical observation by introducing into his model the tax effect
associated with payment method (discussed above). In the presence of a tax effect, the
optimal choice of payment method (cash or stock) faced by the bidder depends on the
relative importance of the tax effect and private information possessed by the target firm.
Another means to reconcile Hansen's theory with the empirical observation of some cash
offers is to allow the acquirer to have private information about the value of its assets.
Like the tax effect, the information advantage on the acquirer side reduces the
importance of private information possessed by the target.
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2.2.23. Empirical evidence on information asymmetries
Empirical evidence supports Myers and Majhifs (1984) argument for the method
of financing in takeovers, while evidence for Hansen's (1987) and Fishman's (1989)
arguments is less clear. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) and Travlos (1987) present
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the payment method conveys information
about the value of the bidding firm. Wansley, Lane, and Yang examine both pre-bid
cumulative average prediction errors (iCAPE) and announcement effects to bidders in
cash and securities transactions. For acquisitions using securities for payment, the excess
returns to bidders from 40 days prior to through 40 days after the takeover
announcement day total -1.51 percent (f-value -1.07), while for cash acquisitions, the
excess returns total 6.17 percent (f-value - 2.31) over the same examination period.
Furthermore, the announcement effects, the excess returns from 1 day prior to through
the announcement day, are significantly positive for the cash bids but significantly
negative for securities-financed bids. Wansley, Lane, and Yang conclude that the
evidence is generally consistent with the notion that "when the bidding firm's
management considers its own stock to be overvalued (undervalued), securities (cash)
will be relatively more attractive as a payment method" (p. 412).
Travlos (1987) also provides evidence supportive of the information effect of
payment method in takeovers on the value of bidding firm. He finds that equity-financed
takeover bids are associated with significantly negative announcement prediction errors
to bidders, while cash offers are associated with positive prediction errors, irrespective of
the type of takeover bid (merger or tender offer). Furthermore, nonconvertible bonds of
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bidding firms that utilize equity for payment experience significantly negative prediction
errors at the takeover announcement, while those of bidders that use cash to finance
takeovers experience slightly positive prediction errors. Cross-sectional analyses
indicate that the announcement-period prediction errors of bidders are significantly
negatively related to the proportion of the transaction financed by common shares of
bidding companies. Travlos concludes that "the evidence is consistent with the findings
provided by the empirical literature on new offerings of common stock" {p. 944) and that
"the market interprets a cash offer as good news and a common stock exchange offer as
bad news about the bidders' true value" (p. 944).
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) analyze divestitures following acquisitions
completed between 1971 and 1982, and conclude that their evidence "is consistent with
the idea that stock financing of an acquisition is a negative signal o f the acquirer's value,
rather than a negative signal about the acquisition” (p. 126). Specifically, they find that
bidder abnormal returns are 3.52% lower (significant at the 1% level) for equity-financed
acquisitions than for cash acquisitions, and that the ex post success o f acquisitions (based
on whether the targets are subsequently divested because of their poor performance) is
independent of the type of payment method in acquisitions. That is, the cash acquisitions
are as likely to be poorly performing as are securities-financed ones. The latter result
does not support Fishman's (1989) theory that bidding firms use cash to acquire highlyvalued targets.
Empirical evidence on whether the medium of exchange in takeovers signals the
value of the target’s shares is provided by Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994), who
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analyze the relation between the method of payment and valuation effects associated
with terminated merger proposals. These authors report significantly higher cumulative
excess returns for the target’s shareholders after termination o f cash offers than after
termination of stock offers even 250 days after termination when no subsequent takeover
*

bids follow. The evidence, however, is weak because it is rarefy announced which party
(i.e. the bidder or the target) terminates the deal. The identity o f the party calling off the
deal is important because a deal canceled by the bidder conveys exactly the opposite
information (about the target's value) than does a deal canceled by the target.
2.2.3. Information asymmetry and the role of financial intermediaries
The presumption of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and
outside investors about the value o f the firm has given rise to the development of models
that argue that financial intermediaries expend resources to gather private information to
evaluate and monitor corporate activities. This section reviews the literature on the role
of three types of financial intermediaries: investment banks, commercial banks, and
accounting firms.
Diamond (1984), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), among others, argue
that bank loans impound asymmetric information and provide monitoring services. In
their models, banks process private information to evaluate and monitor borrowing firms
at lower costs than other market participants. Diamond argues that a financial
intermediary such as a bank has a cost advantage in processing the private information
about corporate activities because the alternative is either duplication o f effort if each
security-holder (e.g., atomistic shareholders) monitors directly, or a free-rider problem,
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in which case no security-holder monitors. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) show that
if information asymmetries are present, banks can enhance the welfare for the society as
a whole by rectifying these asymmetries. Special attention is paid to some mechanisms,
such as forming a coalition, employed by intermediaries to reduce the uncertain payoff
nature associated with gathering information. Further, Fama (1985) argues that the
periodic and short-term nature of bank loans reduces the needs of other security-holders
to perform costly monitoring and evaluation of corporate activities because other
security-holders can periodically infer the value of borrowing firms by observing the
willingness of banks to grant borrowers renewals of short-term loans.
Titman and Trueman (1986) theorize that in the presence of information
asymmetry, accounting firms gather private information to certify corporate activities.
An important element of Titman and Trueman's model is that the higher the quality of a
financial intermediary, the more weight the market places on the information produced
by this intermediary. Managers with favorable asymmetric information find it optimal to
hire high-quality auditors to confirm managers' favorable private information, while
managers with unfavorable inside information would choose low-quality auditors over
high-quality ones in the fear that high-quality auditors would be more likely to detect and
reveal the unfavorable private information.
Titman and Trueman (1986) contend that the argument of managerial choice of
accounting firms can be applied to the choice of investment banks, namely that the
choice of investment banks signals the quality of managers' private information about the
firm’s value. Investment banks that underwrite unseasoned equity offerings have
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reputation at stake, and earn a return on this reputation. It is shown that reputable
managers (or entrepreneurs) with favorable asymmetric information find it optimal to
retain high-quality investment banks to confirm the quality of the private information.
Conversely, managers with unfavorable private information will choose low-quality
investment banks to underwrite the issues because high-quality investment banks would
be more likely to detect and reveal this unfavorable private information. Thus,
managerial choice of investment banks signals the quality o f managers' information about
the firm’s value.
Several financial economists also argue that investment banks use their reputation
to certify that the offer price in an equity issuance is consistent with private information.
Booth and Smith (1986) analyze the cost of underwriter certification, and develop a
theory of the role of investment banks in certifying that risky prices reflect adverse inside
information. Beatty and Ritter (1986) suggest that high-quality investment banks only
underwrite high-quality and low-risk issues, implying that the choice of investment banks
for underwriting an equity offering signals the inside information about the firm’s value.
In a world of incomplete information, managers with favorable private
information have an incentive to employ credible mechanisms by which outside investors
can infer the quality of the private information and the value of the firm. This self
sorting process leads to a shift from a lemons' market, as described in Akerlof (1970),
where assets are priced with average risk of all assets in a category (e.g. used cars as a
category) to a 'separating' equilibrium where assets are priced according to their assetspecific risks, resulting in an improvement in information efficiency.
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Empirical evidence supports the notion that financial intermediaries, such as
investment banks, commercial banks, and accounting firms, provide valuable monitoring
and certification services that mitigate the problems arising from the information
asymmetry between managers and outside investors about the firm’s value. James
(1987) presents empirical evidence that bank loans impound private information and
monitoring services. He reports that the borrowing firms experience statistically
significant positive excess returns when new bank credit agreements or expansions of
existing bank loan agreements are announced. Beatty and Ritter (1986) report evidence
supportive o f the notion that investment banks which misprice initial public offerings
subsequently lose market share of underwriting business. This result emphasizes the
importance of investment banks’ reputation in the process of underwriting equity
offerings. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990) find that the market reaction to
announcements of seasoned equity offerings varies with the presence o f accounting
firms, commercial banks, and underwriters. They find that the prediction errors of the
firms that announced seasoned equity offerings are positively related to the quantity of
bank debt in a firm's capital structure, the quality o f the investment bank that underwrites
the issue, and the quality of the accounting firm that audits the firm. The evidence is
consistent with the notion that commercial banks, underwriters, and auditors perform
monitoring and certification roles in the security issuance process.
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1 3 . A Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
2.3.1. A theoretical analysis
23.1.1. The model
A model to analyze how financial intermediaries serves to convey information in
a firm's decision to issue shares to finance investment projects, such as takeovers, is
developed from Titman and Trueman's theory (1986) of entrepreneurs' choice of
intermediary quality in new shares offerings. This analysis differs from Titman and
Trueman's model in that the bidder maximizes the value of the firm given the bidder's
private information, while, in Titman and Trueman, entrepreneurs maximize expected
utility.
Basic assumptions of this model are: ( 1 ), the focus of information asymmetry is
about the value of the bidder's shares, not about the value of the target's shares or
synergy. (2 ), the market places more weight on the information provided by high-quality
intermediaries than on the information by low-quality intermediaries. Titman and
Trueman (1986) argue that high-quality intermediaries expend more resources to process
private information, and, thus, would be able to offer a more precise and trustworthy
estimate o f a firm's prospects. (3), investors (including bidder's shareholders) are riskneutral. This assumption is made to simplify the analysis. The implication of this
assumption is that investors are indifferent between taking the expected value o f a
gamble with certainty and taking the gamble itself (a gamble is a payoff structure with
uncertain outcome). Bidder's managers are assumed to act in the best interest of their
shareholders.
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Suppose the bidder has decided to acquire the target The bidder will produce a
random cash flow c at the end o f the period. The market updates its belief about the
value of c upon the arrival of information (or signal) related to c.
The bidder receives private information about c through observing the signal i.
That is, given c,
7=c+e i

( 1)

where e i ~ N(0,1/A) and is independent of c. Assuming that the prior distribution c is
diffuse, the posterior distribution conditional on i is normal with mean i and variance l/h.
Although outside investors do not have the same information access as corporate
insiders do, investors receive useful information from other sources. One source is the
inform ation revealed or disclosed by financial intermediaries (such as auditors,
com mercial banks, and investment banks) that have access to corporate activities. For

example, ( 1 ), the market participants can observe the willingness of commercial banks to
make loans to the bidders as a signal of how lending banks view the prospects of the
bidders. (2 ), accounting firms summarize their estimates about the bidders' activities in
the financial reports. (3), bidders' investment banks provide their assessments about the
bidders' corporate activities in the negotiation process in takeovers. Observing such
information generates investors' assessment of a firm's cash flow. Specifically, given c,
the investors' estimate of a firm's cash flow is:
tc = c + s

2
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where e 2~ N(0, Vq) and is independent of c. q is the quality of an intermediary.
Assuming that the prior distribution c is diffuse, the posterior distribution conditional on
;ris normal with mean rrand variance \!q. e i is assumed to be independent o ie 2.
Investors can estimate the firm's end-of-period cash flow, c, by taking into
account the bidder's optimal choice of intermediary quality. This is sustainable if the
choice o f intermediary quality is a strictly increasing function of bidder's private
information, /. Under this scenario, investors would be able to infer the bidder's private
information / from the knowledge of the intermediary quality, q , optimally chosen by
bidder. This inference,^*), is such that:
A q ) =i

(3)

Investors have two sources o f information to estimate the firm's cash flow, c.
information released by the intermediary, and the firm's choice of intermediary quality.
Under the notion that high-quality intermediaries expend more resources to process the
information and have higher reputation capital at stake than lower-quality intermediaries
do, the former are presumed to offer a more precise estimate of c. Thus, the market will
place more weight on the information provided by high-quality intermediaries. Investors'
re-assessment of c upon an announcement of stock offer is then characterized by:

E(c 1* ?•)=*(?V+ (l-

(4)

K q) =q H q + h )

(5)

where

Equation (5) implies that the higher the intermediary quality, q, the more weight the
market will place on the information the intermediary produces.
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Because investors are risk-neutral, the re-evaluation of the bidder's value before
the intermediary cost, m{q), is :

v{x, q)=E{c\7t,qm)

(6)

The bidder acts in the best interests of its shareholders. Thus, the bidder
maximizes its market value after the intermediary cost given the private information, /, it
observes. Equivalently, the bidder maximizes the market's re-evaluation of the bidder's
shares, net o f intermediary cost, given /:
E(fH i) ~ E(v(x;

m(q)

(7)

The bidder pays m(q) for the services provided by intermediary. m(q) increases with
intermediary quality, q, i.e. m' (q) > 0, reflecting the notion that the higher the quality of
an intermediary, the higher the intermediation cost
Differentiating equation (7 ) with respect to q gives the first-order condition for
the optimal choice of intermediary quality;

0 -Aq)) h/(q + hf+ hf'iq) I (q + h)-m'(q) = 0

(8)

The choice o f q will correctly reveal the bidder's private information, /, if there is
a strictly increasing function/^?) which simultaneously satisfies equation (3) and ( 8 ).
Substituting equation (3) into (8 ) and solving fbr/fc") yields investors' inference
schedule as:
r .

ir/m +h)dt/h + z

(9)

where z is the constant term obtained from the integral process. qmmis the lowest level
of intermediary quality.
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Differentiating equation (9) with respect to q yields:
/ '( q ) = m '(q*)(? + h ) fh >

0

(10)

The equation above holds because the cost function of the use o f intermediary, m (q), is
an increasing function o f the intermediary quality, q.
Equation (10) implies that, first, the investors' inference function,^*), about the
bidder's private information, /, is a one-to-one function in mathematical terms. Should
the inference function not be a one-to-one function, investors would be unable to
correctly infer the private information possessed by corporate insiders. This is because a
non-one-to-one function may have the cases where two different values o f q have the
same value of /. Second, the inference function is a strictly positive function in q . Thus,
cross-sectionally, the better the bidder's private information, the higher the intermediary
quality chosen by the bidder's managers.
2.3.1.2. Re-evaluation of the bidder's value in a stock offer and intermediary
quality
Cross-sectionally, the market's re-assessment o f the bidder's value in stock offers
is a strictly positive function of the bidder's choice of intermediary quality. That is, the
market uses the information of the intermediary quality chosen by a bidder to alter the reevaluation of the bidder's shares: the higher the choice of intermediary quality made by a
bidder, the more favorable the market's reaction to an announcement of a stock offer.

i
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Proof:
Substituting^*) - i into equation (7) yields:

Kq) / + ( i - Kq) )Aq) -

= Aq*) - rta )

( ii)

Differentiating equation (11) with respect to q and using equation (10) gives the
following result:

{q)(q +h ) f h - m’

= (g/h)m’( ? ) > 0

( 12)

Equation (12) holds because of the fact ?*> 0 , A > 0 , and the assumption mr(?*)
> 0. The intuition of equation (12) is that the market's reaction to announcements of
stock offers increases with q ', the optimal choice of intermediary quality made by the
bidders.
2.3.I.3. What deters low-qualhy firms from mimicking high-quality firms
A separating equilibrium is such that a bidder (denoted as bidder I) with less
favorable private information finds it not worthwhile to mimic another bidder (bidder 2)
with more favorable information The intuition is that if bidder 1 did mimic bidder 2, the
high-quality intermediary would have revealed the less favorable information possessed
by bidder 1.
Analysis:
Observe equations (4) and (5).
Consider two bidders: bidder 1 has less favorable information than bidder 2.
Bidder 2 optimally chooses the intermediary quality, q2, according to equation (8 ), where
the subscript indicates the bidder. This implies that the marginal net benefits o f using
the next higher-quality intermediary are zero (or, slightly negative, to be technically
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correct). Marginal net benefits are measured by changes in the firm's value minus
changes in intermediary cost as a result o f employing a higher-quality intermediary.
If bidder / did mimic bidder 2 by choosing the same intermediary quality, q2,
used by bidder 2 , it2 is expected to be less than m (where the subscript denotes the
bidder) because the information generated by the intermediary for firm 1 is expected to
be less favorable than for firm 2. With the same_/(?z), k(g2) and intermediation costs
m(q2) for both firms at q2, expected value o f bidder 1 is strictly lower than that of firm 2 .
Since the marginal net benefits o f bidder 2 at q2 are zero, the marginal net
benefits of bidder 1 at q2 must be strictly negative. This implies that, to maximize its
market value, bidder I will choose a lower intermediary quality qi < q2.
In summary, it is the difference in marginal benefits (rather than marginal costs)
of the use of intermediaries that deters such mimicking.
2.3.2. Cash offers versus stock offers
The difference between a cash offer and a stock offer is that investors do not
confer with any private information to evaluate cash, while investors rely on indications
of insiders' private information to set the value of new common shares. Since, unlike a
stock offer, a cash offer incurs no information problems at all, the value of external
monitoring in a stock offer should exceed that in a cash offer.
The price reaction of bidders' shares in response to the announcement o f stock
financing of a takeover likely reflects both the information effect and the investment
effect from a takeover. This study does not argue for a zero investment effect from a
takeover, but rather assumes that the investment effect, on average, is unaffected by
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medium of exchange in the absence of competition among bidding firms. Prior studies
on the medium o f exchange in takeovers (such as Travlos, 1987, and Wansley, Lane, and
Yang, 1987) also implicitly make such an assumption.
2.3.3. Major hypotheses
Both theoretical model (Myers and Majluf 1984) and empirical evidence
(Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987, and Travlos, 1987) support the notion that the market
interprets the decision to issue equity to finance a takeover as an unfavorable signal
about the value o f the bidding firm's shares. Conversely, the market views the use of
cash as the payment method as favorable (or, at least not negative) information about the
value of the bidders' shares. Thus, financial intermediaries should play an important role
in addressing at least two problems associated with equity-financed takeovers: adverse
selection and moral hazard.
When a takeover is financed by the bidder's stock, an adverse selection problem
arises because managers of the bidding firm are more informed than outside investors
(including managers and shareholders of the target firm) about the value of bidder's
shares. Titman and Trueman (1986) and Booth and Smith (1986) theorize that
investment banks certify the quality of private information in the process of underwriting
equity offerings and, therefore, help facilitate the self-sorting of managers with favorable
asymmetric information. Similarly, the analysis in section 2.3.1 argues that, in equityfinanced takeovers, a bidder with favorable private information finds it optimal to employ
a high-quality investment bank to confirm that it is o f a high value.
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Titman and Trueman (1986) and the analysis in section 2.3.1 theorize that the
choice o f auditors (accounting firms) signals the quality o f corporate insiders' private
information about the firm’s value. When the bidder's managers use securities to finance
takeovers, an adverse selection problem arises because these managers know more about
the value of their firms than do outsiders. As discussed bisection 2.3.1, the certification
performed by high-quality auditors facilitates self selection of the firms with favorable
private information. Thus, the reputation of auditors can mitigate the adverse selection
problem associated with stock financing of a takeover.
When a takeover is financed by bidder's equity, shareholders o f target firms face a
potential moral hazard problem because the bidder's share value depends on the
managerial efforts subsequent to the stock offer. Banking theory predicts that
commercial banks can effectively mitigate a moral hazard problem associated with
equity-financed takeovers. Theoretical models such as those of Diamond (1984),
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), and Fama (1985) argue that bank loans impound
private information and that commercial banks are monitors o f corporate activities in the
lending process because o f the banks’ cost advantage o f monitoring and the short-term
nature of bank loans. Because bank monitoring generates benefits for other security
holders (including atomistic shareholders) throughout the life of bank loans, it reduces
the moral hazard problem associated with external financing. Based on this line of
reasoning, managers ofbidding firms with unfavorable private information or high tastes
for consuming excessive perquisites find bank loans (which entail monitoring) costly,
while those with favorable asymmetric information or low tastes for perquisites
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consumption employ bank loans to differentiate themselves from others.

A test of the

theory o f financial intermediation within the context o f the medium of exchange in
takeovers is equivalent to the tests o f following two arguments. One, as argued above,
within the group o f equity-financed takeovers, the market reaction to a stock offer for
the bidder that uses high-quality financial intermediaries should be more favorable (or
less unfavorable) than that for the bidder that employs low-quality intermediaries.
Two, for all the takeover announcements, the benefits of external monitoring in
stock offers should exceed those, if any, in cash offers. This is because the market views
a stock offer, but not cash offer, as a negative signal about the firm's value (Myers and
Majlu£ 1984). Thus, in a cash offer, the benefits provided by financial intermediaries to
resolve any problem of information asymmetry are largely reduced. The effect of the
presence and reputation of financial intermediation on the bidder's share price reaction to
a takeover announcement measures these monitoring benefits.
2.4. Method of analysis
2.4.1. Measuring the market's reactions to takeovers
2.4.1.1. Event study method
Stock price reactions to announcements of takeover bids are measured by
standard event study methodology as described in Brown and Warner (1985). Under the
assumption o f semi-strong form market efficiency, the announcement effects provide an
unbiased estimate of the market's valuation adjustments in response to the information
contained in the announcement.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
For the 200-trading-day estimation period (t=-250, -51; where t= 0 represents the
event's first appearance date in the W attStreet Journal), market model parameters are
obtained by regressing individual daily returns on the corresponding equal-weighted daily
market index returns, which are provided by the CRSP files. The market model is
defined as:
R jt=aj+ bjR ^+

(

1

3

)

where:
Rjt = rate of return for security j on day t,
Rmt= rate of return for the market index on day t,
Oj =

mean return not explained by the market,

bj =

security j's sensitivity to the market's return,

=

the statistical error.

The predicted return for a firm on a day in the event period is the return
predicted by the market model on that day using the estimates of a,- and bj from the preevent estimation period. That is, the predicted return for security j on day t in the event
window is:
R jt= a, + bjRmt

(14)

The prediction error for security j on day t in the event window is then defined
as:
PEjt=Rjt- R,

(15)

The cumulative prediction error for security j over the event window / = tx to t2 is
calculated as:
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ti
CPEjjti. a) — X PEjt
t= ti

( 16)

The share price reaction for the bidding firms that announce a takeover are
estimated by calculating the average daily prediction error, APE, for all bidders on day t.
That is,

^

N /=!

o ’)

where N is the number of bidders in the sample.
The cumulative average prediction error (CAPE) over an event-window (t= h to
t2) is the sum of the daily average prediction errors:
CAPE = £ APEt

( 18)

f=n

The average price reaction to a takeover announcement is the CAPE estimated over the
two-day event window (t= - 1 , 0 ).
To test whether the CAPE of a sample is significantly different from zero, the test
statistic is obtained by dividing the CAPE by the square root of the product o f the
estimation-period variance and the number of days in the CAPE event-window (tj, t2).
The test statistic is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis that the CAPE is
equal to zero if the APE are independent, identically distributed, and normal.
2.4.I.2. Robustness of measuring excess returns: mean- and market-adjusted
returns
To examine the sensitivity of the results in this paper to the specifications of the
above procedure for measuring the announcement excess returns, prediction errors based
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on mean- and market-adjusted returns are also calculated. The use of mean-adjusted
returns addresses one problem of the standard event-study methodology by avoiding the
specification of the risk factors of stock returns. The use of market-adjusted returns in
the event-study controls for a drastic market-wide movement on the announcement date.
2.4.2. Multivariate regression analysis and variable specifications
A weighted-least-squares regression framework is used to test whether the
reputation of financial intermediaries mitigates the negative signal conveyed by the
decision to use equity to finance a takeover. The dependent variable is the two-day
announcement-period cumulative prediction errors for the takeover sample. The
independent variables include variables relating to certification and monitoring of
financial intermediaries, and other relevant variables suggested by extant literature.
Specifically:
CPEi = ao + aiACCi + a2BANKj + ajINV 14 + aJNV^ + ajACCi*STOCKi
+ a<sBANKi«STOCKi + a7INVu*STOCKc+ aglNV^STOCKi
+ 89STOCK1 + aioCOMBOi + anMULTi+ auTENDERi
+ au OWNy + au OWN24 +at5 SIZEi + ai6 RUNUPi
+ an RUNUP2+ei

(19)

where CPEi is the two-day announcement-period cumulative prediction error of firm i
that announces a takeover.
ACCi takes the value of one if the accounting firm employed by the bidder is one

of the Big Six accounting firms, and zero otherwise. Following Dopuch and Simunic
(1982) and Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), the following auditors are identified as
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Big Six accounting firms: Arthur Andeson, Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche,
Ernst and Young, KPMG Marwick, and Price Waterhouse. (Prior to the merger "wave”
among accounting firms in the late 1980s, the Big Eight are generally considered as the
high-quality accounting firms: Arthur Anderson, Peat Marwick, Arthur Young, Ernst
and Whinney, Touche Ross, Price Waterhouse, Coopers and Lybrand, and Deloitte,
Haskins, and Sells.) Dopuch and Simunic argue that the accounting firms above have
higher credibility than other accounting firms because auditor’s reputation is more
important than the procedure in the auditing process.
Following Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), BANK, is the ‘debt in current
liabilities’ minus long-term ‘debt due in one year’ (both obtained from the
COMPUSTAT database) scaled by the sum of the book value o f debt and the market
value of equity. Long-term debt due in one year is subtracted to focus on the periodic
and short-term nature of bank loans. Although debt in current liabilities includes
liabilities due non-banks, the short-term nature of these liabilities is consistent with
Fama's (1985) argument about short-term of bank loans. Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson
(1990) provide a detailed discussion about the appropriateness of this variable.
INVij takes a value of one if the investment bank employed by the bidder in a
takeover is prestigious, and zero otherwise. Following Bowers and Miller (1990) and
Servaes and Zenner (1996), five investment banks in acquisitions are classified as
prestigious (or first-tier): First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
and Salomon Brothers. This classification rule is largely based on Hayes’ (1979)
discussion that a small set of investment banks dominate the industry. Ideally, to test
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whether the results are robust with respect to specification of high-quality investment
banks, a continuous variable based on the underwriting revenues of investment banks
should be used in a separate test Two difficulties emerge. First Investment Dealers’
D igest publishes data of related underwriting revenues only for the fifteen top investment
banks each year. Second, even if such data were available for each investment bank,
there are more than six categories o f related underwriting revenues: revenues based on
common stock offerings with a foil credit to lead investment banks only, common stock
offerings with a full credit to all participating investment banks, common stock offerings
disaggregated by whether foreign offerings or closed-end funds are excluded, initial
public offerings, etc. So for, there is no widely accepted practice as to which category
should be used to rank investment banks.
INV24 takes a value of 1 if the identity of investment bank in a takeover is not
disclosed by the bidder, and 0 otherwise. Excluding offers where the identity of bidders'
investment banks is not disclosed would significantly reduce the number of observations
on bidders' accounting firms and commercial banks.
STOCK, equals 1 if the offer is a stock offer at the announcement; and 0
otherwise.
COMBO; takes a value of 1 for a offer that is funded through a combination of
stock and cash (including debentures); and 0 otherwise. This variable is included to
control for the presence of combination offers in the sample. To preserve a large sample
size, this study does not exclude the offers funded through a combination of stock and
cash. Travlos (1987) uses a similar approach. Alternatively, one could eliminate all the
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combination offers from the sample. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) use that
approach to examine how the bidder's managerial ownership relates to the medium of
exchange in takeovers.
MULTi takes the value o f one if there is a knowledge that a takeover involves

multiple bidders at the announcement, and zero otherwise. This variable is included
because Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Niden (1993) find that the competition
among bidders tends to decrease the announcement returns to bidders but increase the
returns to targets. The observations are based on the first bid of the ultimately successful
bidder. MULTi, therefore, captures the downward bias this selection procedure imposes
on the bidder's announcement returns.
TENDER, is equal to 1 for a tender offer; and 0 otherwise. Announcements are
checked against all 14D-1 forms compiled by the Lexis/Nexis Lie. to identify a tender
offer. This variable is included because Huang and Walkling (1987) report that tender
offers tend to be cash offers. Since this study contrasts cash offers with stock offers, it is
possible that any difference between cash offers and stock offers is a result of acquisition
type (i.e. tender offer or merger) rather than a result of the form of payment.
Ownership variables OWN^and OWN^take the form of binary variables rather
than continuous variables because (1) Stulz’s (1988) model suggests a non-linear effect
of the target’s managerial ownership on the takeover premium and probability of the
success of a bid and (2) Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) report a non-linear relation
between the firm's managerial ownership and the firm's value. In Stulz's theory,
strengthening managerial control of the firm at the low and high managerial ownership
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levels increases the value of the firm, while such a strengthening at the middle managerial
ownership level leads to a decrease in the value o f the firm. Based on Amihud, Lev, and
Travlos’ (1990) finding that negative bidders’ excess returns for takeovers funded
through stock are mainly concentrated in bidders with a low managerial ownership (less
than 5 percent o f bidder's number o f shares outstanding), OWNy takes the value of one
if the bidder’s directors and officers as a group own less than 5 percent of their firm’s
shares prior to the takeover announcement, and zero otherwise. In addition, OWNy
takes the value o f one if the bidder's managerial ownership exceeds 25 percent prior to
the announcement; and zero otherwise. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) report that
their results (as above) are not sensitive to the specification of managerial ownership
(e.g. ownership by top two, top five managers, or all directors and managers).
SIZEi is the logarithm of the market value of the bidder’s equity at the end of the
year prior to the takeover announcement Theoretical models (Fama, 1985, and
Diamond, 1991) and empirical evidence (Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock, 1992) argue
that firm size is likely to be positively related to the public information available about
the firm in the market.
RUNUPiis the price run-up o f the bidder's stock over the 49-day (days -50 to 2)

pre-announcement period, while RUNUP2 is the price run-up in the CRSP equally-

weighted index returns over the 49-day pre-announcement period. RUNUPi is included
in the analysis because security issuance literature, such as Masulis and Korwar (1986),
and Asquith and Mullins (1986), finds that firms tend to conduct seasoned equity
offerings subsequent to a period in which the issuers' stock prices rise. RUNUP2 is
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included because some studies on security issuance, such as Asquith and Mullins (1986),
find that seasoned equity issuance is made following an increase in the general level of
stock prices. The above 48-day pre-announcement period is defined as days -SO to -2
because ( 1 ) the time period used to estimate market-model parameters is days -250 to 51 (where day 0 represents an event's announcement date) and (2 ) the cumulative
prediction errors for an announcement are estimated from days - 1 to 0 .
It is necessary to include interaction terms in the regression analysis above to
compare benefits of external monitoring in stock offers to those in cash offers. The
interpretation o f coefficient estimates of these interaction terms is provided in section
2.6.3.
The Goldfeld-Quandt test is employed to test for heteroscedasticity in the
multivariate regression analysis. The rationale and procedure of Goldfeld-Quandt test
are discussed in the Appendix.
2.5. Date
The initial sample consists o f acquisitions announced during the period January
1989 through December 1995 as reported in the M ergerstat Review. The identity of the
accounting firm for a company is obtained from Compact Disclosure. The bank loan (as
defined in section 2.4.2) data come from the COMPUSTAT database. The identity of the
investment bank involved in a takeover is obtained from the Watt Street Journal and
Mergers and Acquisitions. The announcement date of a proposed bid is the initial date
of the first public announcement of the offer in the Wall Street Journal Index or the filing
date of the first 14D-1 form (for a tender offer), whichever is earlier. Following
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Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) and Travlos (1987), only successful bids are included
in the sample of this study. Travlos (1987) compares unsuccessful bids with successful
ones, and find that results on unsuccessful bids are qualitatively similar to those on
successful ones. The method o f payment is the initial method o f payment announced in
a bid. Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) report that there are few changes between
initially announced payment method and the actual payment method. The payment
method is first obtained from the M ergerstat Review, and then checked against the Wall
Street Journal. If there is a discrepancy between the payment methods for an offer
reported by M ergerstat Review and the Wall Street Journal, the stories for that offer in
the Wall Street Journal are examined to determine the initial method of payment. An
offer is a tender offer if the search o f the Lexis/Nexis database indicates that the bidder
for that offer submits a 14D-1 form. The information of whether an offer involves
multiple bidders at the announcement is obtained from the W all Street Journal. All
returns, such as announcement returns and the price run-ups over the pre-announcement
period, are from the CRSP database.
For the acquisitions to be included in the sample, they must meet the following
criteria:
First, the acquiring firm must have return data on the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) tapes over the period 250 days prior to through 51 days after the
announcement date so that the market reaction to a takeover announcement can be
assessed.
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Second, utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial companies (SIC
codes 6000-6999) are excluded. Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar
(1986) argue that the nature of information, if any, revealed by equity offerings of these
firms differs from that of industrial firms. These researchers suggest that regulation of
these firms implies a less severe problem of asymmetric information.
Third, the acquirers must end up with obtaining more than 50% of the common
shares o f the targets. Acquisitions resulting in less than 50% ownership are excluded
from the sample. Both friendly and hostile acquisitions are included in the analysis.
Fourth, no confounding corporate events to the bidding firm (such as dividends
or earnings announcements) occur during the period two days before through one day
after the announcement date of a proposed bid.
Fifth, the target's shares must be publicly traded. This requirement is imposed
because the motive of a private target firm to accept a stock offer may differ from that of
public target company, such as liquidity considerations.
2.6. Empirical Results
2.6.1. Distribution of the sample
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics. The full sample consists o f324 takeover
announcements over the period January 1989 through December 1995. The distribution
of announcements disaggregated by medium of exchange and year is reported in panel A.
For the full sample, a relatively large number of the takeovers, 158 out o f324 (or 48.77
percent), use stock as the medium of exchange. Ninety six acquisitions (or 29.63
percent) are financed by cash or debentures. Seventy takeovers (or 21.60 percent) are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
Table 2.1
Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded industrial firms over
the period January 1989 through December 199S.
Full sample contains 324 takeover announcements. Restricted sample contains 94
announcements, where all the accounting firms, investment banks, and commercial banking
relationship of the bidders are known. Utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and financial
companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample. Combination offers are those
funded through a combination of cash and stock. Cash offers include those financed by cash and
debenture. ACC takes the value of one if the bidder uses a Big-Six accounting firm. INVi
equals one if the bidder employs a first-tier investment bank and zero otherwise. INV2 equals one
if the identity of bidder's investment bank is not disclosed and zero otherwise. TENDER takes
the value of one for a tender offer and zero otherwise. MULT is equal to one if there are more
than one bidders at the takeover announcement and zero otherwise. OWNi takes the value of one
if ownership by officers and directors as a group is lower than 5 percent and zero otherwise.
OWN2 equals one if ownership by officers and directors exceeds 25 percent and zero otherwise.
PanelA: Number o f announcements by medium o f exchange andyear:fu ll sample
Year
1989 1990 1991
Payment
method

Cash
Combination
Stock
Total

32
5
16
53

9
7
22
38

3
12
29
44

1992

1993

1994

5
13

9

18
7
29
54

11

29

12

18
39

1995 Total
20
14
33
67

PanelB: Characteristics o f takeover announcements:fu ll sample
Descriptive measure

Mean Median Min. Max.

Market value o f the bidder's equity, millions
4,663
Purchase price for the target, m illions
826
Purchase price / market value o f bidder's equity
0.57
Bidder's book value o f debt/ market value of equity 2 . 0 0
Bank loan / (book value o f debt + market value of
equity)
0.030
Equity ownership by bidder's officers and director
as a group
0 .1 2

1,187
176
0.23
0.46

0 .0 1

87,193
19,000
11.04
9.23

0 .0 0 1

0

0.65

0.05

9
10
0 .0 0 1

0 .0 0 0 1

0.71

(table con'd)
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96
70
158
324

Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded industrial firms over
the sample period January 1989 through December 1995.
Panel C: Counts o findicator variables with the value o fone:fu ll sample
Indicator variable

Number o f the counts

ACC= 1
INV!= 1
INV2= 1
TENDER=1
MLJLT= 1
OW N!=l
o w n 2= 1

% o f the full sample
96.60
16.05
70.06
19.44
7.10
54.32
14.20

313
52
227
63
23
176
46

Panel D : Number ofannouncements by medium o fexchange and year:
restricted sample (94 announcements)
Year

Payment
method

Cash
Combination
Stock
Total

1992 1993

1994

1989

1990

1991

7

1

1

2

1

6

8

4

4

7
4
19

1

1

1

5

4

4

11

1

10

11

12

6

13

8

15

21

1995 Total
26
23
45
94

(table con'd)
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Summary statistics for takeover announcements by publicly-traded industrial firms over
the sample period January 1989 through December 1995.
Panel E: Characteristics o ftakeover announcements: restricted sample (94
announcements)
Descriptive measure

Mean Median Min. Max.

Market value of the bidder's equity, millions
7,489
Purchase price for the target, millions
2,279
Purchase price / market value o f bidder's equity
0.91
Bidder’s book value of debt / market value of equity 1.52
Bank loan / (book value of debt + market value of
equity)
0.033
Equity ownership by bidder's officers and director
as a group
0.09

2,428
1 ,0 2 1

0.46
0.51

113 68,116
75 19,000
0.013 2.80
0.01 9.65

0.008
0.03

0

0.56

0.01

0.70

PanelF: Counts o findicator variables with the value o fone:
restricted sample (94 announcements)
Indicator variable
ACC = 1
IN V i= 1
TENDER= 1
M U LT=1
OW Ni= 1
OWN2= l

Number of the counts
90
52
26
9
59
12

% of the restricted sample
95.74
55.32
27.66
9.57
62.77
12.77
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funded through a combination of stock and cash. The sampling criteria selects one to
three percent of all mergers and acquisitions appearing 'mM ergerstat Review. Because
the sample represents large transactions with more complete information available for
bidders, targets, and offers, the results are not generalizable to all mergers and
acquisitions. The selected transactions, however, are likely to be those of greater
economic importance. The sample is also comparable to those drawn in previous studies
of takeovers.
The mean values o f characteristics o f the bidders are reported in panel B. The
mean size o f the bidder's market capitalization is $4,663 million and the median value is
$1,187 million. The mean value of the transaction price divided by the market value of

the bidder's equity is 0.57, while the median value is 0.23. The maximum value of the
ratio of the transaction price to the market value of the bidder's equity is 11.04 (Le.,
Columbia Healthcare Corp.'s acquisition of HCA Healthcare Corp. on October 4 ,1 9 9 3 ).
The mean ratio of bidders' bank loan (defined in section 2.4.2) as a percentage of the
sum o f its book value of total debt and market value of equity is 0.030; the median value
is 0.001. The mean ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity is 2.00; the
median value is 0.46. The mean value of equity ownership by bidders' officers and
directors as a group is 0.12, while the median value is 0.05.
Panel C of Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics on dummy variables used in
the regression analysis. Most ofthe bidders (313 out o f324) in the sample use Big Six
accounting firms. Fifty-two bidders use at least one of the first-tier investment banks:
First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Salomon Brothers.
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Forty-five bidders use non-first-tier investment banks or do not use any investment banks
at all. A search o f the Wall Street Journal and Mergers and Acquisitions finds that the
rest of the bidders in the sample do not disclose whether or not they use any investment
banks. Approximately 19 percent o f the takeover announcements are tender offers.
Twenty-three o f324 takeovers in the sample involve more than one bidder at the initial
announcement. Most of the bidders in the sample (54.32 %) have a managerial
ownership below 5 %; while only 14.20 % of bidders have a managerial ownership above
25 %. The managerial ownership is measured by the percentage of common shares
owned by officers and directors as a group.
Panels D, E, and F of Table 2.1 report the characteristics of the restricted sample,
which contains 94 takeover announcements where all the investment banks, accounting
firms, and commercial banking relationships for the targets are known. As discussed in
section 2.4.2, to preserve a sufficient sample size, both the full sample (324
announcements) and the restricted sample (94 announcements) are analyzed to test the
theory o f financial intermediation in takeovers. The results, discussed in section 2.6.4,
indicate that the conclusions on external monitoring in takeovers are qualitatively sim ilar
in both samples.
2.6.2. Regression results disaggregated by the medium of exchange
Table 2.2 reports Pearson correlation coefficient estimates for the variables used
in the empirical tests. The results reveal that tender offers tend to be associated with the
use of cash as the form of payment. The correlation coefficient between STOCK and
TENDER is significantly negative at the 1 percent level. TENDER and COMBO are
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Table 2.2 Pearson correlation coefficients of variables for 324 takeover announcements from January 1989 to December 199S
BANK is calculated as "debt in current liabilities" minus "debt due in one year" scaled by the sum of debt's book value and equity's market value. ACC takes a
value of 1 if the bidder uses a Big Six auditor, and 0 otherwise. INVi equals 1 if the bidder employs a prestigious investment bank in the takeover, and 0
otherwise. INV2 is equal to 1 if the identity of the investment bank involved in a takeover on the bidder's side is not disclosed; and 0 otherwise. STOCK
equals 1 for a stock ofTer, and 0 otherwise. COMBO equals 1 for a combination offer, and 0 otherwise. TENDER equals 1 if the offer is a tender offer; and 0
otherwise. MULT takes the value of 1 if the offer involves multiple bidders at the announcement; and 0 otherwise. OWNi equals 1 if ownership by bidder's
officers and directors as a group is below 5 %; and 0 otherwise. OWN2equals 1 if ownership by bidder's officers and directors exceeds 25 %; and 0 otherwise.
SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of bidder's equity, /^values are in parentheses.

MULT
TENDER 0.08
(0.17)
MULT
STOCK
COMBO
OWN,
OWN2
SIZE
BANK
INV,
INV2

STOCK

COMBO

OWN,

ow n 2

SIZE

BANK

INV,

INVj

ACC

-0.44*”
(0 .0 0 )
-0.17***
(0 .0 0 )

-0 . 12 **
(0 .0 2 )
0 . 10 *
(0.07)
-0.53***
(0 .0 0 )

0 . 11 *

-0.04
(0.44)
-0.01
(0.87)
0.04
(0.53)

0.13**
(0 .0 2 )
0.06
(0.29)
-0.03
(0.63)
-0,04
(0.46)
0.39**’
(0 .0 0 )
-0.31***
(0 .0 0 )

-0 .0 2
(0 .6 8 )
0.06
(0.32)
-0 . 12 **
(0,03)
O.U*
(0.05)
0 . 11 *
(0.05)

0,08
(0.16)
0.04
(0.47)
0.03
(0.62)

-0.14”
(0 .0 1 )
-0.08
(0.14)

-0,00
(0.96)
0.05
(0.38)
-0.01
(0.89)
0 06
(0.31)
-0,06
(0.31)
0.02
(0.70)
0.09*
(0.09)
0.04
(0.49)
0.03
(0.58)
0.04
(0.48)

(0.06)
0.01

(0.83)
-0.08
(0.17)
-0,05
(0,39)

0 .0 0

(0.94)
-0.44***
(0 .0 0 )

0.01
(0 .86 )

0.07
(0 .2 2 )

0.01

(0.84)
0.05
(0.33)
-0.04
(0.51)
0 .2 2 ***
(0 .0 0 )
0,08
(0.15)

0.01

(0.92)
-0 .0 2
(0.72)
-0 .11 ”
(0.04)
0,03
(0.54)
-0.31***
(0 .0 0 )
-0 .0 2
(0.77)
-0 .6 8 ***
(0 .0 0 )

TENDR
MULT
STOCK
COMB
OWN,
OWN2
SIZE
BANK
INV,
INV2

(table con'd)
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Pearson correlation coefficients of variables for 324 takeover announcements from January 1989 to December 199S
BANK is calculated as "debt in current liabilities" minus "debt due in one year" scaled by the sum of debt's book value and equity's market value, ACC takes a
value of 1 if the bidder uses a Big Six auditor, and 0 otherwise, INV] equals 1 if the bidder employs a prestigious investment bank in the takeover; and 0
otherwise. INV2 is equal to 1 if the identity of the investment bank involved in a takeover on the bidder's side is not disclosed; and 0 otherwise, STOCK
equals 1 for a stock offer, and 0 otherwise, COMBO equals 1 for a combination offer, and 0 otherwise, TENDER equals 1 if the offer is a tender offer, and 0
otherwise. MULT takes the value of 1 if the offer involves multiple bidders at the announcement; and 0 otherwise. OWN) equals 1 if ownership by bidder's
officers and directors as a group is below 5 %; and 0 otherwise. OWN2equals 1 if ownership by bidder’s officers and directors exceeds 23 %; and 0 otherwise.
SIZE is the logarithm ofthe market value of bidder's equity, p-values are in parentheses.

TENDER

MULT

STOCK

COMBO

OWN,

OWNj

SIZE

BANK

INV,

INVz

RUNUP,

-0.10*
(0.08)

-0.01
(0.90)

0.06
(0.26)

-0.04
(0.51)

0.07
(0.22)

0.00
(0.89)

-0.04
(0.49)

0.08
(0.15)

-0,05
(0.40)

0.04
(0.52)

RUNUPj

-0.02
(0.68)

-0.00
(0.97)

-0.03
(0.63)

0.06
(0.28)

-0,00
(0.98)

0.00

0.09*
(0.09)

-0.08
(0.17)

0.00

0.02
(0.68)

ACC

RUNUP2

RUNUP,

0.08
(0.18)

0.18***
(0.00)

RUNUPj

0.03
(0.60)

*, **, and

(0.89)

(0.89)

indicate statistical significance at the 10, S, and 1 percent levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
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also negatively correlated at the 5 percent level. In addition, SIZE is positively
correlated with the use o f two high-quality intermediaries: first-tier investment banks
(INVi) and Big-Six accounting firms (ACC). This suggests that large firms tend to use
prestigious investment banks and auditors. SIZE, however, is not significantly correlated
with BANK. The payment method variables (STOCK and COMBO) are generally not
correlated with two external monitoring variables (INVi, and ACC) at conventional
levels. This insignificance in correlation alone, however, does not imply that external
monitors play no role in addressing the information asymmetry problem (as discussed in
section 2.3.4). The bidder's pre-announcement share price run-up, RUNUPi, and the
run-up of equally-weighted market returns, RUNUP2, are not correlated with the
payment method variables.
Results on bidders' two-day announcement excess returns for takeovers
disaggregated by the medium o f exchange are consistent with those reported by previous
studies (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987, Travlos, 1987, and Kaplan and Weisbach,
1992). Table 2.3 indicates a mean value of announcement excess returns for stock offers
of - 2.09 %, significant at the 1 % level (/-value = -4.91). Approximately seventy
percent of bidders in stock offers experience negative announcement excess returns
significant at the I % level based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test ( z value - -S.31). The
median value of bidders' announcement excess returns is - 1.78 percent. The mean
values of bidders' excess returns for both cash and combination offers are insignificantly
different from zero at conventional levels (/-values for cash offers and combination offers
are -0.55 and -0.96, respectively). Wilcoxon signed ranks tests on the proportion of
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Table 2.3
Bidder's two-day announcement cumulative average prediction errors (CAPE) for 348
takeover announcements over the period January 1989 through December 1995.
Initial takeover announcements come from Mergerstat Review. All announcements are
checked against the Watt Street Journal. Utilities firms (SIC codes 4900-4999) and
financial companies (SIC codes 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample. Combination
offers are those funded through a combination of cash and stock. Cash offers include
those financed by cash and debenture. Two-day cumulative average prediction errors
(CAPEs) are calculated by using standard event-study method as described in Brown and
Warner (1985). The test statistic on CAPE is obtained by dividing the CAPE by the
square root o f the product ofthe estimation-period variance and 2 (which is the number
of days in the event window). Significance test on the proportion o f negative two-day
announcement prediction errors is based on Wilcoxon signed ranks test and reported as z
value.

Mean
CAPE

f-value

%
negative
returns

Median
r-value CAPE

Category

Sample
size

Cash offers

96

-0.24%

-0.55

50.00%

-0.30

- 0.02 %

Combination offers

70

- 0.64 %

-0.96

57.90%

-1.26

- 0.62 %

Stock offers

158

-2.09%

-4.91

70.32%

-5.3 i*~ - 1.78 %

.

•••

*, " , and ***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively,
in two tailed tests.
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negative excess returns also provide the same insignificance results for both cash and
combination offers.
The value o f external monitoring in a multivariate regression framework is
examined next The dependent variable is the two-day announcement excess returns,
CPE, for the sample o f takeover announcements disaggregated by the medium of
exchange. Because Goldfeld-Quant test yields a F-value o f 3.15 (significant at the 1
percent level), coefficients are estimated using weighted least squares with the standard
error of estimation period residuals (obtained from the market model) as the weighting
factor to adjust for heteroscedasticity in the variances o f stock returns across firms in the
sample.
Table 2.4 presents the test results for the takeover announcements by the method
of payment. The specifications of the proxies for external monitoring follow previous
studies of Servaes and Zenner (1996), Slovin, Sushka, and Hudson (1990), and Dopuch
and Simunic (1982). Details o f variable specifications are discussed in section 2.4.2.
Table 2.4 presents the test results. For cash offers, the null hypothesis that all
coefficients but the intercept are equal to zero cannot be rejected at conventional levels
(F-value = 1.22). This suggest that none o f the independent variables, including external
monitoring variables and ownership variables, are important factors in explaining bidders'
announcement excess returns in cash offers. Similarly, test results for combination offers
indicate that the null hypothesis that all coefficients but the intercept are equal to zero
cannot be rejected at conventional levels (F-value = 1.15).
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Table 2.4
Estimated coefficients o f regressions of cumulative excess returns surrounding takeover
announcements made between January 1989 through December 1995
ACCtakesa nine of l ifthe bidderuses a Big Six auditor;and0 otherwise. INViequals 1 ifthe bidderemploys a
prestigious investmentbankm die takeover; andOathcnrise. INVziseqnalto 1 iftbe identityofthe investment
bankinvolvedma takeoveron thebidder'sside is notdisclosed; and0 otherwise. STOCKequals 1 fir a stock
offer, and0 otherwise. COMBOtakes a value of 1 fo a combinationoffer, and0 otherwise. TENDERequals 1if
theofferis a tenderofier; and0 otherwise. MULTtakesthevalueof 1 ifthere are multiple biddersat the
announcement;and0 otherwise. OWNt equals 1 ifequity ownershipbybidder's officers anddirectors as a group is
belowSK; and0 otherwise. OWN2 equals I ifownersfaipbybidder'sofficers anddirectors is largerthan25 %;
and0 otherwise. S1/-Kis thelogarithmofthe marketvalueofbidder's equity. RUNUPi is the bidder's stockprice
run-upovera 49-dayper-mnouncemeutperiod. RUNUP2 is the pricerun-up ofequally-weightedCRSPindexover
a 49^Jaypre-announcementperiod. Prestigious investmenthank*andBig Six auditorsaredefined in section 2.4.2.
BANKis calculatedas’debtin current liabilities'minus ’debtdne in one year1scaled bythe sumofdebt's book
value andequity's market value.
Independent
variable

Coefif

Cash offers

Combo offers

Stock offers

Intercept

bo

4.14

(1-45)

-7.80

(-112)

-3.75

(-124)

ACC

bi

-0.20

C-o.ii)

9.98

(1-59)

-0.36

(-0.15)

BANK

b3

-6.46

(-0.96)

-1.15

(-0.21)

13.78

(2.40)“

INVt

b3

-1.46

(-1.01)

-2.73

(-133)

•0.18

(0-13)

INV2

b4

-0.35

(-0.31)

0.92

(0.52)

-0.04

(-0.04)

MULT

bs

0.89

(0.73)

-0.99

(-0.52)

-4.90

(-1.85)*

TENDER

b6

-1.85

(-2.12)“

0.46

(0.22)

4.21

(117)

OWN,

br

-0.78

(-0.74)

2.07

(1.48)

0.47

(0.46)

OWN2

b,

0.23

(0.13)

-2.24

(-1.31)

2.78

(2.10)“

SIZE

bo

-0.27

(-1-10)

■0.51

(1-10)

0.18

(0.58)

RUNUP,

bio

0.13

(0.47)

0.33

(0.51)

0.15

(0.67)

RUNUP2

b,i

-0.22

(-0.19)

0.79

(-1.76)*

-1.07

(-121)

F
R2
AdjustedB?
# of observations

1.22
0.14
0.03
96

1.15
0.17
0.02
70

1.91“
0.13
0.06
158

" , and ” *denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in two-tailed
tests.
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For stock offers, however, the F-vahie for the test of the hypothesis that all coefficients
but intercept are equal to zero is 1.91, significant at the 5 percent level. The banking
relationship variable has a significantly positive coefficient 13.78 at the 5 percent level
(/-value = 2.40). Thus, investors use the information o f the bidder's banking relationship
to alter the valuation o f the bidder's shares in stock offers. The high-ownership variable,
OWN2 (which takes the value o f one if bidders' managerial ownership exceeds 25 %; and
zero otherwise), has a positive coefficient significant at the 5 percent level (/-value =
2.10). This is consistent with Stulz's (1988) and Amihid, Lev, and Travlos' (1991)
argument that the market views the financing decisions applied by firms with relatively
high managerial ownership to be consistent with shareholders' value maximization (since
managers with relatively high equity ownership act as they are the owners of the firm).
All other coefficients are insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels for
stock transactions. MULT (capturing the competition effect in a takeover) obtains a
negative coefficient estimate at the 10 percent level, consistent with the notion that the
competition in takeovers decreases the returns to bidders.
2 .(3 . Regression results for the entire sample
Unlike in seasoned equity and initial public offerings, bidders' managers in equityfinanced takeovers are "bound" in that the proceeds are earmarked to purchase the
targets' assets. Thus, it is necessary to compare the market reactions in the presence of
high-quality external monitors in stock offers to those in cash offers. Under the
argument set forth by Myers and Majluf (1984), Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987),
Travlos (1987), and the theoretical analysis in section 2.3.1, the value of external
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monitoring in stock offers should exceed that in cash offers because the information
signaled by stock offers is less favorable (or more unfavorable) than the information, if
any, conveyed by cash offers.
The interaction terms (ACOSTOCK, BANK«STOCK, and INV>STOCK)
capture the benefits of external monitoring in stock offers, compared to those in cash
offers. To see why, consider four bidders: bidder 7 o f a cash offer and bidder 2 of a
stock offer use Big-Six accounting firms and first-tier investment banks, and have p %
bank debt in their capital structure; bidder 3 o f a cash offer and bidder ¥ of a stock offer
use non-Big-Six accounting firms and, non-first-tier investment banks, and have q %
bank debt in their capital structure. The regression equation (Equation 19 in section
2.4.2) predicts bidder 7's announcement excess return to be a0+ at + (p/100)a2 + a3 + an
+ ai2+ ... + a!7 (assuming for now that all independent variables are important in
explaining bidders' excess returns). Bidder 2's announcement excess return is predicted
to bea0+-a/ +(p/100) a2+a3+as + (p/100)a$+ a7+ a9 + an+ ai2+ ...+ a!7. Similarly,
bidder 3's and bidder ¥s excess returns are projected to be a0+ (q/lOOfa + an + at2 +
... +a/7andao+(^/100)a2 + (^/100)atf+aff+ an +a12 + ... + a / 7, respectively. The
benefits, if any, of external monitoring in cash offers are obtained by subtracting bidder
3's excess return form bidder 7's excess returns: namely a7 + ((p-q)/100)&2 + a3. The
benefits of external monitoring in stock offers can be obtained by subtracting bidder ^s
excess return form bidder 2's excess returns: namely a7 + ((p-?)/1 0 0 )a2 + a3+ as + ((p<7)/100)a<s+ a7. It then follows that the coefficients of interaction terms (i.e., a3, a6, and
a7) capture the benefits of external monitoring in stock offers, compared to cash offers.
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Table 2.5
Estimated coefficients o f regressions cumulative excess returns surrounding takeover
announcements made between January 1989 through December 1995.
Thecoefficients areestimated using weighted least squareswith the standarderrorofestimation-periodresiduals
as thew eighting factorto adjustforheteroscedasticity. ACC takesa value of 1 ifthe bidderuses a Big Six auditor;
and0 otherwise. INVtequals 1 ifthe bidderemploys a prestigious investmentbank in the takeover, and0
otherwise. INV2isequalto 1 ifthe identityofthe investmentbankinvolved in a takeoveran the bidder's side is
not disclosed; and0 otherwise. STOCKequals 1 fora stock offer; and 0 otherwise. COMBOtakes a valueof 1 for
a combinationoffer; and0 otherwise. TENDER,equals 1 if the offeris a tender offer, and0 otherwise. MULT
takesthe value of I if thereis a knowledge thatthe offerinvolves multiple bidders at the announcement; and0
otherwise. OWN] equals 1 if equity ownershipbybidder'sofficers and directors as a group is below 5 %;and0
otherwise. OWN2 equals 1 ifownership bybidder'sofficers anddirectors is largerthan25%; and0 otherwise.
S lZ F .isaqnal to th a logarithm o f th e H A W *

f^pitalraation in eq u atio n s S.1 an d 5.2; an d equals 1 ifth e

bidder's marketcapitalization is belowthe medianvalue ofall industrial firms on the CRSP tape; and0 otherwise.
RUNUPi is the bidder's stock price run-upovera 49-dayper-announcementperiod. RUNUP2is the price run-upof
equally-weightedCRSPindex overa 49-daypre-announcementperiod, r-values are in parentheses.
Independent
variable
variable
Intercept
ACC
BANK
INV,
inv 2
ACC«STOCK
BANKaSTOCK
INV,•STOCK
inv 2. stock
STOCK
COMBO
MULT
TENDER
OWN,
OWN2
SIZE
RUNUP,
RUNUP2
F
R2
Adjusted B?
# of observations

Coeff.
a0
ai
a2
a3
a4
as
06
a7
as
a9
ai0
an
an
an
an
au
at6
an

Market model CPE

Mean-adjusted CPE

0.00
0.87
-2.06
-1.43
0.51
-0.99
17.53
1.70
-0.56
-1.78
-0.74
-0.51
-1.08
0.66
1.47
0.14
0.15
-0.71

-0.01
0.99
-1.91
-1.24
0.36
-0.29
18.47
1.56
-0.60
-2.52
-0.77
-0.36
-0.99
0.80
1.67
•0.18
0.18
-0.75

2.10"*
0.10
0.05
324

(0.00)
(0.42)
(-0-51)
(-1-18)
(0.52)
(-0.32)
(2.61)”'
(0.93)
(-0.38)
(-0.55)
(-0.89)
(-0.52)
(-1.32)
(1-03)
(1.55)
(-0.78)
(-106)
(-1.12)

(-0.00)
(0-47)
(-0.46)
(-1.00)
(0.36)
(-0.09)
(2.69)“*
(0.83)
(-0.39)
(-0.76)
(-0.91)
(-0.36)
(-1.18)
(1-23)
(172)*
(-101)
(123)
(-116)

2.19”*
0.11
0.06
324

Binary size
-0.70
0.61
-1.93
-1.32
0.65
1.12
16.91
1.56
-0.55
-1.67
-0.77
-0.58
-1.13
0.53
1.62
-0.73
0.16
-0.82

(-0.31)
(029)
(-0.48)
(-1-09)
(0.67)
(-0.36)
(2-50)**
(0.85)
(-0.37)
(-0.52)
(-0.93)
(-0.60)
(-1.37)
(0.88)
(1-73)*
(-0.63)
(1-13)
(-129)

2.08***
0.10
0.05
324

*, **, and ***denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, in
two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.5 presents evidence consistent with notion that external monitors, particularly
commercial banks, generate additional value gains for bidders in stock offers, compared
to cash offers, hi Table 2.5, with the market model generated CPE as the dependent
variable, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term STOCK»BANK is 17.53,
significantly positive at the 1 percent level (with /-values of 2.61). There is no evidence
of any significant effects of Big Six accounting firms and first-tier investment banks on
bidders' announcement excess returns in stock offers. The coefficient estimates of
ACOSTOCK and INV>STOCK variables are insignificantly different from zero at
conventional levels. Unlike in Table 2.4, the high-ownership variable, OWN2, is no
longer significant, implying that the managerial ownership effect is sensitive with respect
to the sample selection (and, possibly, the definition o f a "high" managerial ownership).
Other independent variables are insignificantly different from zero, after controlling for
the existence of banking relationship and managerial ownership.
Taken together, the results are consistent with the notion that the market uses the
information of bidders' banking relationships to assess bidders' value in stock offers. The
results on accounting firms and investment banks are insignificant. Why does the market
view commercial banks to be more effective monitors than accounting firms and
investment banks in stock offers ? One explanation is that accounting firms and
investment banks may not commit as much capital or do not have as great an information
advantage as do commercial banks. As Fama (1985) argues, bank loans place the
commercial bank's equity at risk throughout the maturity of the loan, and, commercial
banks have information access (to the client firms) that other market participants do not
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have. Thus, commercial banks have both incentive and information advantage to
monitor the client firms.
2.6.4. Other variables and sensitivity tests
Brown and Warner (1985) report that the estimation o f excess returns is
generally insensitive to the models selected. Nevertheless, mean- and market-adjusted
(using value-weighted CRSP returns as benchmark) returns are also used to calculate
CPEs for the dependent variable in the regression analysis. The use of mean-adjusted
returns avoids the specification of risk factors of stock returns. The use of marketadjusted returns takes into account potential drastic market-wide price movements at the
announcement dates. Table 2.5 also reports the regression results using two-day meanadjusted returns to generate CPEs. The findings on external monitoring are similar to
those using the market model CPE as the dependent variable. Only BANK*STOCK and
0WN2 have estimated coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level
or better. Similarly, the regression results using the market-adjusted returns to calculate
CPEs (not reported here) indicate that only BANK*STOCK and OWN2 exhibit
estimated coefficients significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
BANK*STOCK obtains a coefficient estimate of 17.79 and a /-value of 2.65, significant
at the 1 percent level, while OWN2 has a coefficient estimate of 1.72 and a /-value 1.81,
significant at the 10 percent level.
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1991) argue that the firm size effect is not linear.
The firm-size effect arises because relatively large firms tend to use prestigious
investment banks and Big Six auditors. Fama (1985) and Diamond (1991) argue that the
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benefits of certification and monitoring services provided by intermediaries like
commercial banks are directly related to borrower size. This is because firm size is
positively related to the amount of public information about the firm available in the
market.
To address the firm-size effect, I use a binary variable that takes a value of one if
the bidder is below the median market value o f all industrial firms on the CRSP database;
and zero otherwise. All industrial firms on the CRSP database, not just the all the firms
in my sample, are used to eliminate the selection bias o f the takeover sample. The results
are reported in Table 2.5. This variable obtains an insignificant coefficient of -0.73 (tvahie: -0.63). This suggests that the firm-size effect is not an important variable
explaining bidders' announcement excess returns in takeovers. More importantly, the
inclusion of this binary variable does not affect the coefficients of the external monitoring
variables.
The impact of specification of independent variable INV2 (which takes the value
of one if the identity of bidders' investment bank is not disclosed; and zero otherwise) on
the regression results is tested. It is likely that the result (in Tables 2.4 and 2.5) that
bidders' use of first-tier investment banks in stock offers does not affect bidders'
announcement excess returns is due to the fact that about two-thirds of bidders in the
entire sample do not disclose the identity of investment banks. To investigate this
possibility, the regression analysis is conducted on the 94 takeover announcements where
the identities o f all three intermediaries (i.e. accounting firms, commercial banks, and
investment banks) are disclosed.
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Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics of this restricted sample. A comparison
of these 94 announcements to the full sample (324 announcements) reveals that the
bidders in the restricted sample are generally larger firms, have a lower managerial
ownership, involve more competition, and are more likely to be tender offers. However,
the distribution ofthe methods o f payment is similar for both the full and restricted
samples.
Table 2.6 presents the test results for the restricted sample. Consistent with the
results for the full sample, Table 2.6 indicates that the market uses the information of
bidders' banking relationship to re-assess bidders' value in stock offers. The evidence on
external monitoring provided by auditors and investment banks are still insignificant.
Specifically, the coefficient of interaction term of banking relationship and stock (i.e.,
BANK»STOCK) is positive at the 5 percent level, with a point estimate o f35.78.
Coefficient estimates of interaction terms ACC»STOCK and INVi*STOCK remain
insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels. The high-ownership variable
(which equals one if bidders' managerial ownership is larger than 25 %; and zero
otherwise) has a coefficient estimate insignificantly different from zero at conventional
levels. TENDER (for a tender offer), however, obtains a negative coefficient estimate at
the 10 percent leveL It is premature to make a conclusion simply based on this
significant result on TENDER since TENDER is insignificant in the tests of the full
sample. The fifth and sixth columns of Table 2.6 use bidders' mean-adjusted returns as
the dependent variable; while the seventh and eighth columns use a binary variable to
capture bidders' size (namely, the binary variable takes the value of one if bidders' equity
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Table 2.6
Estimated coefficients of regressions cumulative excess returns surrounding takeover
announcements where all the identities o f accounting firms, investment banks, and
commercial banks are known.
The coefficients ire csrtm»t«dusing weighted least squareswiththe standarderrorofestimation-periodresiduals
as the weighting factorto adjustfarhetooacedasticity. ACC takes a valueof I if the bidderuses a Big Six auditor,
and0 otherwise. INViequals 1 if the bidderemploys a prestigiousinvestmentbankin the takeover; and0
otherwise. STOCKequals 1 fora stockoffer; and0 otherwise. COMBOtakesa value of 1 fara combination offer,
and0 otherwise. TENDERequals 1 ifthe offer is a tenderoffer, and0 otherwise. MULTtakes the value of 1 if
there is a knowledge thattheofferinvolves multiple bidders at theannouncement; and0 otherwise. OWNi equals
1 if equityownership by bidder'sofficers anddirectorsas a groupis below5 %; and0 otherwise. OWN2 equals 1if
ownership by bidder's officers anddirectors is largerthan25 %;and0 otherwise. SIZEis equal to the logarithmof
the bidder's marketcapitalizationin equations 5.1 and5.2; andequals 1 if the bidder's market capitalization is
belowthe median value ofall industrial firms on the CRSPper-announcementperiod. RUNUPzis the price run-up
ofequally-weighted CRSPindexovera 49-daypre-announcementperiod. Prestigious investment banksare First
Boston, Goldman Sachs, MerrillLynch,MorganStanley, and SalomonBrothers. BANKis calculated as 'debt in
currentliabilities' minus 'debtduein one year1scaledby the sumofdebt's book value andequity'smarket value.
Big Six auditors areArthurAnderson, Coopers& Lybrand, Deloitte &Touche, Ernst andYoung, KPMGMarwick,
andPrice andWaterhouse, r-values are in parentheses.
Independent
variable
variable
Intercept
ACC
BANK
INVj
ACC*STOCK
BANK-STOCK
INVj*STOCK
STOCK
COMBO
MULT
TENDER
OWN,
OWN2
SIZE
RUNUP,
RUNUP2
F
R2
Adjusted R2
# of observations

’, ”, and
tests.

Coeff.
a0
at
a2
a$
a4
as
a6
ai
at
a.
a10
an
at3
at3
at4
an

Market model CPE

Mean-adjusted CPE

Binary size

5J3
0.57
-14.71
-0.73
-1.59
35.78
1.19
-5.00
-3.49
-1.42
-4.18
2.54
1.04
-OJl
0.12
-1.73

6.63
0.50
-19.93
-0.42
2.00
39.25
1.08
-8.62
-3.88
-0.95
-4.48
3.12
1.44
-0.67
0.15
-1.95

-0.27 (-0.05)
2.44 (0.41)
-18.06 (-1.35)
-1.13 (-0.75)
-3.94 (-0.50)
41.94 (2.34)*"
1.22 (0.56)
-2.12 (-0.27)
-3.29 (-1.58)
-1.18 (-0.61)
-4.47 (-2.03)*
1.90 (131)
1.50 (0.69)
4.17 (1-25)
0.08 (0.20)
-1.49 (-0.82)

1.65*
0.24
0.10
94

(0.91)
(0.11)
(-1-17)
(-0.49)
(-0-16)
(2.14)"
(0.54)
(-0.67)
(-1.63)
(-0-74)
(-195)*
(163)
(0-48)
(-1.14)
(0.31)
(-0.95)

(1-10)
(0.09)
(-154)
(-0.27)
(0.27)
(2.27)**
(0.48)
(-1-13)
(-1.75)
(-0.48)
(-2.03)*
(194)
(0.64)
(-1.44)
(0-37)
(-1.04)

1.71*
0.25
0.10
94

1.67*
0.24
0.10
94

denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%levels, respectively, in two-tailed
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value is lower than the median value o f all industrial firms on the CRSP database, and
zero otherwise). The results indicate that the conclusions about auditor, banking
relationship, and investment banks remains the same as in Table 2.5 with respect to
specifications of bidders' announcement excess returns, equity size, and variables
pertaining to studies of seasoned equity offerings (such as bidders' stock price run-up
and price run-up of equally-weighted CRSP index returns over the pre-announcement
period).
Table 2.6 can be interpreted with the following example to illustrate the value
generated by bidders' commercial banking relationship in stock offers. Consider two
bidders in stock takeovers: bidder / with a 4 % bank debt (which is approximately at the
bottom of the highest quartfle among all bidders in the sample) in its capital structure,
and bidder 2 with a zero bank debt. Further assume that the choice of auditor quality,
the choice of investment bank quality, and the managerial ownership are the same for
two bidders. The third and fourth columns of Table 2.6 indicate that the share price
reaction to bidder l's stock offer announcement would be 1.43 (= 0.04 • 35.78)
percentage points higher than that to bidder 2's stock offer announcement.
Finally, because over 96 percent of the sample employed a "Big Six” accounting
firm, ACC effectively becomes the intercept To check for effects of this specification,
the regressions in Table 2.5 were estimated without ACC. The results are similar with
the exception that the estimate of coefficient on STOCK becomes significant at the 10
percent level (coefficient = -2.70, f =-1.80 for the market model CPE regression). This
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finding is consistent with prior finding that announcement effects for bidders in stock
transactions are smaller than those for cash or combination offers. The details are not
presented here. Similar results are obtained for the regressions in Table 2.6 where ACC
is omitted.
2.7. Conclusions
Previous studies have provided two major theories to explain the choice of
medium of exchange in takeovers: tax considerations, and private information revealed
by announcements of equity-financed takeovers. In this paper, Titman and Trueman's
(1986) model of entrepreneurs' choice of intermediary quality in new shares offerings is
modified to analyze how the choice of financial intermediaries that monitor the firm
conveys private information possessed by corporate insiders in a takeover. Next,
empirical tests determine whether the financial market uses the information about a
bidder's choice of investment bank, accounting firm, and commercial banking relationship
to assess the private information possessed by the bidder's managers in a stock offer.
The results on commercial banks are consistent with the theory of financial
intermediation, hi stock offers, the share price reactions are positively related to bidders'
commercial banking relationship. Further, o f all takeover announcements in the sample,
the external monitoring generated by bidders' commercial banking relationship in stock
offers generates higher value gains to the bidders, relative to those for cash offers.
Evidence that the choice o f high-quality accounting firms and first-tier investment banks
alters the market reactions to announcements of stock offers is not found. Thus, the
results presented in this paper suggest that commercial banks are effective external
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monitors and serve to reveal the private information possessed by corporate insiders
about the prospects o f the firm.
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Chapter 3
Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Takeover Targets and Medium of Exchange
3.1. Introduction
Theories which employ informational asymmetry to explain why managers o f
bidding firms choose equity or cash as the medium o f exchange in takeovers differ from
one another in the focus of that asymmetry: (1) the value o f the bidding firm's shares, (2)
the value o f any synergy, and (3) the value of the target firm's shares. Although there is
plenty o f empirical evidence on the first two theories (see Wansley, Lane, and Yang,
1987, Travlos, 1987, and Huang and Walkling, 1987, for the first theory, and Kaplan and
Weisbach, 1992, for the second one), empirical evidence on the third theory is relatively
scarce.
The objective of this paper is to offer new evidence on whether the medium of
exchange in takeovers conveys information about the value of target firms. Previous
literature has examined the stock returns of the targets in takeover bids (e.g., Wansley,
Lane, and Yang, 1983, and Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson, 1994). This stock-retum
approach, however, is difficult to interpret since it combines any information effects of
the medium of exchange with the tax effects associated with the medium of exchange. A
tax effect results from the fret that gains to shareholders of the targets in cash
transactions are immediately taxable, while gains to shareholders of the targets in stockfinanced takeovers are deferred until the new shares are sold (see Wansley, Lane, and
Yang, 1983, and Huang and Walkling, 1987). This study avoids the tax effect by
61
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examining whether analyst earnings forecast revisions for target firms depend on the
payment method in takeover bids. The major hypothesis tested is that an announcement
o f using cash to finance a takeover conveys favorable information about the value of the
target firm, while the use o f equity as the payment method signals relatively unfavorable
information.
In contrast to a similar prior study (Brous and Kini, 1993), this study finds that
financial analysts do not unambiguously revise upward their earnings forecasts for the
target firms in takeover attempts. Specifically, the results in this study indicate that, for
all tender offers in the sample, analysts significantly raise their earnings forecasts for the
current forecast-year for the target firms at the month following the initial takeover
announcement, but not for the following forecast-year. The present study and the study
by Brous and Kini differ by time period studied. The difference in time is significant in
that during earlier period cash dominated these transactions, while stock is the dominant
medium o f exchange during the more recent period. This suggests that the difference in
results is likely to be time dependent.
This study also finds that unexpected earnings forecast revisions for the targets in
cash tender offers do not significantly differ from those in tender offers that are financed
in part by stock. This result holds regardless of whether revised earnings forecasts are
for the current forecast-year or the following forecast-year. This suggests that the
market does not perceive the choice of payment method in takeovers to convey
information about the target's value.
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The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related
theories and empirical evidence. Section 3.3 discusses the foundation of the empirical
analysis used in this study. Section 3.4 sets out major hypotheses. Section 3.5 describes
method of analysis. Empirical results are provided in section 3.6. Section 3.6 concludes
this chapter.
3.2. Related models and empirical evidence
Myers and Majluf (1984) focus on the information asymmetry between the firms'
managers and outside investors over the value of the firms' shares. Myers and Majluf
argue that the market believes that managers will not issue common shares unless they
view the shares of their firms to be overvalued in the market Thus, in a takeover, the
market would interpret the use of bidder's stock as payment method as unfavorable
information, while the use o f cash as favorable information about the bidders' value.
Empirical evidence provided by Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987), and Travlos
(1987) is consistent with Myers and Majlufs (1984) argument on payment method in
takeovers. Specifically, Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1987) find that the announcement
excess returns to stockholders of the bidder are significantly positive for cash bids but
significantly negative for bids financed by securities. In addition, Travlos (1987) finds
that irrespective of acquisition type (i.e., mergers or tender offers), cash offers are
associated with significantly positive announcement-period excess returns to bidders,
while equity-financed bids are associated with significantly negative excess returns to
bidders. Furthermore, nonconvertible bonds issued by bidders involved in equityfinanced takeovers experience significantly negative excess returns at the takeover
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announcement, while those issued by bidders in cash offers experience slightly positive
excess returns. Taken together, the evidence is supportive o f the notion that the market
views a cash offer as good news and a stock offer as bad news about the bidders' value.
Fishman (1987) assumes that both the bidder and the target have private
information about the valuation ofthe target (operated as part ofthe bidder). He also
assumes that costs of collecting information about the valuation for the target are
nontrivial, and a takeover offer will bring forth potential competition for the target.
Under these settings, when the bidder has information that the target has a relatively high
valuation, the bidder will use cash to acquire the target and to pre-empt a competing bid.
When the bidder's information about the valuation for the target is less optimistic, the
bidder will use equity as the payment method to solicit the private information possessed
by the target.
Empirical evidence provided by Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), however, is
inconsistent with Fishman's argument (1987). Kaplan and Weisbach find that, ex post,
the cash acquisitions are just as likely to be poorly performing as the takeovers funded
through equity.
Hansen (1987) emphasizes the information asymmetry between the target's
managers and outside investors about the value of the target's assets. In Hansen's theory,
when the target firm has private information that the acquirer does not have about the
target's value, for every cash offer that is acceptable (i.e. wealth increasing) to the
acquirer, there exists a stock offer that dominates that cash offer. That is, the expected
wealth of the stock offer exceeds that of the cash offer.
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To reconcile his theory with the empirical observation o f some cash offers,
Hansen (1987) introduces into his model the tax effect associated with payment method
(discussed in section 3.1). In the presence of a tax effect, the optimal choice of payment
method (cash or stock) faced by the bidder depends on the relative importance of the tax
effect and private information possessed by the target firm. Another means to reconcile
Hansen's theory with the existence o f cash offers is to allow the acquirer to have private
information about the value of its assets. Like the tax effect, the information advantage
on the bidder's side reduces the importance of information advantage on the target's side,
and, thus, allows the model to be consistent with the empirical observation of some cash
offers.
Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994) provide evidence consistent with the notion
the medium of exchange conveys information about the value o f the target firms. They
examine whether differences in the market's reaction to terminated merger proposals
depends on the medium of exchange. Examining 123 merger proposal announcements
over 1980 - 1988 that were subsequently canceled, Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson find
significantly higher cumulative excess returns for target shareholders after termination of
cash offers than after termination o f stock offers, even when no subsequent bids follow.
They interpret this result as supportive o f the view that the medium o f exchange conveys
information about the target firms' stand-alone value or its unique synergy potential,
consistent with Fishman (1987). Further, Sullivan, Jensen, and Hudson (1994) do not
find a revaluation of the bidders' shares after the termination o f merger proposals. It is
possible, however, that the insignificant difference in the returns for the bidding firms is a
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consequence o f the "long-term" nature of the period examined (which starts at the
announcement date and ends at the termination date).
3.3. Foundation of the analysis
This section discusses two key assumptions underlying the analysis: one, financial
analysts continue to provide forecasts for target firms as stand-alone entities, and two,
revisions of analysts' forecasts of earnings represent changes in the market's expectations
about the firm's value.
3.3.1. Do analysts continue to issue forecasts for the firms in takeover bids as
stand-alone entities ?
This chapter assumes financial analysts continue to provide forecasts for target
firms as stand-alone entities during takeover bids. Pound (1988) examines retail reports
from brokerage houses, conducts a survey, and concludes that during takeover bids,
analysts indeed issue forecasts for target companies as independent entities, rather than
as a part o f bidders. As Pound points out, takeover contests normally result in large
share price increases for target firms, and thus, create high demand among investors for
analysts' evaluations of the targets. To meet this high demand and assist investors in
assessing the fairness of takeover prices offered by bidders, analysts continue to forecast
stand-alone earnings (and values) for target firms. One example provided by Pound
(1988, p. 209) is the following:
"In evaluating thefairness ofN estle's 1984 bidfor Carnation, Value
Line stated: 'The offer is a fa ir one, in our opinion. It is 14.4 times

i ■
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I984's estimated earnings and 12.6 times 1985's—a healthy price fo r a
fo o d company, even one as cash rich and profitable as Carnation.’"
3.3.2. Do revisions o f analysts' forecasts of earnings reflect changes in the market's
expectations ?
Several studies suggest that revisions o f analysts' forecasts of earnings impound
the information relevant to the pricing of the underlying securities. Brown and Rozeflf
(1978) compare dme-series models with analyst forecasts, and conclude that analyst
forecasts are superior to time-series models as measures of expectations o f earnings.
Brown, Foster, and Noreen (1985) provide an extensive analysis and summarize other
research on analysts' earnings forecasts. They conclude that there is significant positive
covariance between analyst forecast revisions andfirm-specific excess returns. This
implies that analysts revise their earnings forecasts in concert with the information that
affects the value of securities.
Studies of various other financial events have viewed revisions of earnings
forecasts as indicative of the information content of the event. Among these events are:
open-market share repurchases (Bartov, 1991, and Hertzel and Jain, 1991), seasoned
equity offerings (Healy and Palepu, 1990, and Brous, 1992), tender offers (Pound, 1988,
and Brous and Kini, 1993), dividend policy (Ofer and Siegel, 1987, and Shen, 1994), and
equity-for-debt swaps (Israel, Ofer, and Seigel, 1989). For example, Brous (1992)
reports that analysts systematically revise downward earnings forecasts for the firms that
announce plans to issue seasoned equity. This finding is consistent with the view that
announcements of seasoned equity offerings convey unfavorable information about the

i
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value of the firm. Pound (1988) and Brous and Kini (1993) examine whether takeover
bids convey information about the target firms by analyzing analyst forecasts. Neither
Pound or Brous and Kini examine the medium o f exchange in takeovers.
If the bidder and the target have private information about the value o f the target
(instead o f the value o f any synergy), the bidder will use cash to acquire the target when
the bidder has information indicating a relatively high valuation o f the target. Cash is
also used to pre-empt competing bids because the use of cash signals a high valuation of
the target, and the competing bidders' expected payoffs decrease in the initial bidder's
valuation of the target (Fishman, 1987). (The bidder learns of the value of the target by
expending resources to collect information about the target's assets.) When the bidder is
less certain of its information about the value of the target, equity will be offered to
solicit the information possessed by the target Based on this argument we expect to
observe revisions of analyst earnings forecasts for target firms in cash takeover bids to
exceed those in securities-exchange acquisitions. That is, revisions of analysts' forecasts
of earnings for the target firms in response to announcements of cash takeover bids
should exceed revisions in response to announcements of equity-financed offers.
3.4. Method of Analysis
3.4.1. Estimating excess earnings forecast revisions
Previous research has identified two statistical properties o f analysts' earnings
forecasts that are relevant in determining the excess earnings forecast revisions. First,
O'Brien (1988) and Brous (1992) report that analysts' earnings forecasts are subject to
an optimism bias. Analysts, on average, tend to overestimate earnings at the early stage
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of the forecast-year and then systematically revise downward their forecasts as time goes
by. This optimism bias implies that the observed monthly earnings forecast revision (i.e.
the difference between the mean o f the earnings forecasts for a firm at month t and at
month t-1) is not zero.
Second, Brous and Kini (1993) observe that approximately 20 percent of the
analysts following the same firm update their forecasts each month. This implies that any
information released in a particular month will be impounded in the means o f monthly
analysts' forecast revisions over several subsequent months. Thus, the means of monthly
forecast revisions should be positively serially correlated. For example, suppose a
favorable information about the prospects o f IBM was released in May, and 20 percent
of the analysts following IBM update their earnings forecasts at the end of May.
Without losing generality, assume no other information about IBM is released during the
subsequent four months. Under this scenario, we would expect to observe positive
earnings forecast revisions at the end of May because o f the favorable information. We
should also expect to observe positive forecast revisions over four subsequent months
because the remaining 80 percent o f the analysts following IBM would impound this
favorable information into their forecasts over this four-month period. Therefore, in
general, the serial correlation of the means o f monthly forecast revisions is positive.
Brous (1992) provides evidence for the serial correlation of monthly forecast revisions.
Because of these two features of analysts' forecast revisions, a fourth-order
moving average time-series model is used to estimate unexpected earnings forecast
revisions. A fourth-order (rather than fifth-order) moving average model capture the
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observation that, on average, 20 percent of the analysts update their forecasts each
month. In general, if 1/N o f the analysts update their forecasts every month, an (N-l)//r
order moving average is appropriate to specify the process o f analysts' forecast revisions.
A fourth-order moving-average (MA(4)) model is used instead of an
autoregressive (AR) model because the autocorrelation o f observations in an MA(4)
model is well consistent with the positive serial correlation o f monthly analyst forecast
revisions (as discussed above). In contrast, an AR model (i.e., Yt=9Y,.i + ...) does not
correspond with the process o f analyst forecast revisions. An autoregressive integrated
moving average (ARIMA) model is not used in the analysis because there is no economic
theory or evidence on analyst forecast behavior to support the adjustment of'integration'
(e.g., by applying the operation o f yt - yt-i to the entire time-series observations).
Hamilton (1994) provides a detailed discussion about the statistical properties of AR,
MA, and ARIMA models.
The analysis follows Brous and Kini's (1993) procedure for estimating the
unexpected forecast revisions. The observed (unadjusted) monthly analyst earnings
forecast revision for firm i during month t, FRut, is calculated:
FRU = (Fut - Fw )/P w
where

(20)

Fut - mean of analysts' earnings forecasts for firm i at month t,
Pi.t.i - price of common stock of firm / at the end of month t-1.

Share price, Pu-u rather than other variables such as actual earnings per share, is used to
deflate the difference in earnings forecasts in equation (20) for two reasons. First,
Christie (1987) suggests that share price is less correlated with earnings than are other
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variables. Second, Pound (1988) argues that the use of share price as the denominator
improves the distribution of earnings revisions, relative to normalizing on previous
earnings or previous forecasts, because earnings series are highly unstable (for example,
switching from negative to positive earnings for two consecutive quarters or years) and
seasonal. Brous and Kini (1993) also use the share price to deflate earnings forecasts to
obtain forecast revisions, as in equation (20).
Because financial analysts are subject to the optimism bias described above, each
earnings forecast revision is decomposed into forecastable and unforecastable
components:
FRu = af + yu

(21)

FR^ forecast revision for firm / submitted by individual analyst k at

where
month/,

a, = forecastable component of forecast revision for firm i,
yu =

unforecastable component o f forecast revision.

yu is not serially correlated because the probability of the arrival of favorable information
(relating to firm i) is expected to be the same as that of unfavorable information. The
term yw reflects the information analysts receive or process during the current month t.
Suppose analysts update their earnings forecasts every n months. The 'aggregate'
forecast revisions for the group of analysts who update their forecasts during month t,
GFRU, can be expressed as:
it—I

G FRtt- na(+ £

y«-/

7=0
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The lagged terms of yWv (i.e., yu.h yu.2, ..., Yu-fn-v) are included to reflect the information
about the firm's prospects that was received or processed by the ^ of analysts over the
preceding n -\ months.
The mean earnings forecast revision for firm / at month /, FR.J, is then:
FRU’ - - GFRU= a,+ - £ Tw
n
n j=o

(23)

hi this study, n is equal to 5 because approximately 20percent of the analysts whose
earnings forecasts are available on the I/B/E/S database, which is used in this study, are
assumed to update their forecasts each month (Brous and Kini, 1993).
The expected mean forecast revision at month t for firm /, E(FRU'), is estimated
by taking the expectation of equation (23). That is:
E ( « 0 = a, + - X yw
n

(24)

/= 1

The term ya drops out o f the equation (24) because E(y*.f) is zero [to be technically
correct, E(yir Itime = t) = 0], reflecting the notion that the impact on share prices of
good news is, on average, the same as that of bad news.
The unexpected forecast revision at month t for firm i, UFRU, can be written as:
UFRut = F R j - E (R O = ru

(25)

To obtain the expected forecast revisions, defined by equation (24), the MA(4)
model is estimated using all months for which earnings forecasts are available, excluding
event months -6 to +6, consistent with Brous and Kini (1993). The unexpected
component, yu-j, is measured as the difference between the forecastable component, a„
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and the actual forecast revision in month i. Thus, the expected forecast revision for firm
/ in month t equals ah phis the weighted average of the four previous months' unexpected
component, where the weights are equal to 0.5.
3.4.2. Alignment between event dates and 1/B/E/S earnings forecasts
It is important to incorporate analysts' behavior o f updating their earnings
forecasts in estimating unexpected earnings forecasts. Brown, Foster, and Noreen's
(1985) survey of analysts' behavior indicates that approximately 85 percent of all
financial analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to eamings-related
information within five business days. Thus, seven calendar days are allowed from the
initial takeover announcement date to the first possible date when I/B/E/S recorded an
earnings forecast revision related to the takeover announcement. That is, the event
month zero for forecasts is defined as the thirty-calendar-day window from 7 calendar
days after to 36 days after the initial announcement date.
3.4.3. Multivariate regression analysis
Multivariate regression framework is used to analyze whether the medium of
exchange and managerial resistance to a takeover bid convey information about the value
of target firms. The model is specified as:
UFR/= do + a i METHOD;+ a 2RESISTS 8/
where

UFR,

-

(26)

unexpected forecast revision in response to takeover bid
announcement r, as defined by equation (25);

METHODj = 1 for an offer funded through stock or a combination of
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cash and stock; 0 for a cash offer;
RESIST; -

1 if the target's management is opposed to the bid within
30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover
announcement; and 0 otherwise;

et

—

statistical error term.

No interaction term, i.e., METHOD; •RESIST,, is included in equation (26) because
none of combination offers in my sample are hostile takeovers. The inclusion of this
interaction term would cause a serious multicollinearity problem in estimating the
coefficients in equation (26).
The independent variable RESIST; indicates whether the target's managers are
opposed to the bid over a 30-day period following the initial takeover announcement.
RESIST; is included in the analysis because Pound (1988) reports that analysts' forecasts
o f earnings fall significantly when the target's management resists the takeover bid. A
30-day period is chosen to incorporate all effects of resistance on unexpected earnings
forecast revisions because the dependent variable in the regression is monthly unexpected
earnings forecast revisions. Table 3.2 indicates that most of the targets in hostile
takeover attempts (14 out of 17, or 82.35 percent) in the sample disclose the targets'
attitude toward the bid within 30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover
announcement.
The test of the hypothesis described in section 3.3 is equivalent to the test of
coefficients ai. That is, if forecast revisions in cash offers exceed those in stock offers,
then a ; should be negative.
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3.4.4. "W hisper earnings"
Forecasts of yearly rather than quarterly earnings are used in estimating
unexpected forecast revisions to minimize the problem associated with the "whisper
earnings" phenomenon. The following section describes the "whisper earnings”
phenomenon and discusses the implications. The Wall Street Journal (January 15,1997)
reports that after the close of a quarter (and before the actual earnings announcement
date), published earnings forecasts for that quarter no longer represent the market's
expectations. Instead, the market's "true" expectations on which traders make their buy
or sell decisions are "whisper earnings", rumors which swirl among traders and
institutional investors. "Whisper earnings" likely exist because analysts tend to focus on
the upcoming year, and the close of a quarter typically precedes the actual earnings
announcement date by a few weeks. Thus, once a quarter is over, analysts rarely update
their earnings forecasts for that quarter. As an analyst interviewed by the Wall Street
Journal (January 15, 1997,p . Cl) putit:
"Once a quarter is over, I never bother changing [earnings] estimates.
Thefocus is on the comingyear.n
The implications of the [arguable] existence o f "whisper earnings" for this study
are that, in the case where takeover bids are announced surrounding the close of a
quarter and the actual earnings announcement dates, observations o f analysts' earnings
forecasts are truncated (i.e. some of earnings forecasts are unobservable). These
unobservable earnings forecasts would have been available had these analysts continued
to issue forecasts after the close of a quarter. Also, for takeover bids that are announced
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well before the close of a quarter, analyst forecasts should not be subject to the "whisper
earnings" phenomenon, and, thus, the forecasts for these announcements do not suffer a
loss of observations (i.e. truncation).
There are at least two possible approaches to minimize the problem associated
with the "whisper earnings" phenomenon. The first approach, used here because of the
sample size concern, is to analyze annual rather than quarterly earnings forecasts.
Annual forecasts have fewer truncated observations around the takeover announcement
dates than do quarterly forecasts because more takeover announcements fall between the
close of a quarter and the actual earnings announcement date than between the close of a
fiscal year and the actual earnings announcement date corresponding to that year (since
the number o f quarters exceeds that of years in a fixed time span). Second, takeover
bids can be disaggregated based on whether they are announced between the close of a
quarter and the actual earnings announcement date. Test results of these two groups of
takeover bids are then contrasted to examine whether the results on the entire sample are
robust to the reported "whisper earnings" phenomenon.
The existence of "whisper earnings", nevertheless, implies that some analyst
forecasts around the close of a quarter are still not reported by analysts over the
estimation period used here to estimate the unexpected earnings forecast revisions. The
second approach is not used because only 10 combination offers and 74 cash offers (all
of which are tender offers) during January 1988 to December 1995 survive the sample
selection criteria of this study. Imposing the restrictions of the second approach would
have resulted in further reduction of the sample size.
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3.5. Data
The initial takeover announcements come from Mergerstat Review and Mergers
and Acquisitions over the period Jamiaiy 1988 to December 1995. These
announcements are then checked against all 14D-1 forms compiled by the Lexis/Nexis
Inc. to identify tender offers. A tender offer is a takeover attempt where the bidder
bypasses the target firm's board of directors and offers to buy shares directly from target
firm shareholders. The bidder in a tender offer is required to file a 14D-1 form to the
Securities and Exchange Commission. To be included in the final sample of this study,
the target firms must meet the following criteria:
First, the bidder must intend to obtain more than 50 percent o f the target's
common shares outstanding. Partial acquisitions o f 50 percent or fewer o f the shares are
excluded from the sample.
Second, the target's share prices must be available on the CRSP database so that
analyst earnings forecasts can be normalized by the target's share price, as discussed in
section 3.5.1.
Third, each target firm must be followed by financial analysts whose earnings
forecasts are available on the I/B/E/S database.
Fourth, the announcement date is defined as either the first filing date of 14D-1
forms submitted to the SEC or the initial Wall Street Journal announcement date,
whichever is earlier.
Fifth, the Wall Street Journal Index is searched to determine whether there are
subsequent changes in method of payment. Any takeover in which the payment method
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switches either from cash to stock or from stock to cash is excluded from the sample.
Changes in payment method make it difficult to unambiguously define the payment
method for the target, particularly when the two different payment methods are
announced within a 30-day time span (since estimates are of monthly forecast revisions
in response to a takeover announcement).
Sixth, the information whether the target's management resists a takeover attempt
comes form the Watt Street Journal Index.
Seventh, the bidder must be a publicly-traded firm so that the bidder can choose
from cash, stock, and combination of cash and stock as payment method.
3.6. Empirical Results
Tables 3.1 presents the frequency distribution of the tender offers in the final
sample. O f the 84 tender offers where analysts' forecasts of earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the targets are available at the takeover announcement in the
sample, 74 announcements, or 88.10 percent, take the form of cash as payment method.
The remaining 10 tender offers, or 11.90 percent, are funded through a combination of
cash and stock. Surprisingly, no stock offers survive the data selection criteria as
described in section 3.5. There are two stock tender offers (the target firms: CMX Corp.
and Costar Corp.) appearing over the period January 1988 to December 1995.
However, revisions of analysts' forecasts o f yearly earnings for CMX Corp. reported by
the I/B/E/S end at November 30, 1983, nearly five years earlier than the offer
announcement date November 8, 1988. Revisions o f forecasts of earnings for Costar
Corp. are also unavailable on the I/B/E/S database seven calendar days subsequent to the
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Table 3.1
Frequency distribution o f the sample of tender offers announced over the period January
1988 to December 199S
The targets of these tender offers are followed by financial analysts whose forecasts are
available in the I/B/E/S database at the takeover announcements. In addition, the bidders
must intend to obtain more than SOpercent of the targets' common shares outstanding.
No partial acquisitions are included. The targets' share prices must be available on the
CRSP database. The bidders are publicly-traded firms.

1988 1989

1990 1991

1992

1993

1994 1995 Total

Cash offers

22

6

7

9

5

9

10

6

74

Combination
offers

1

0

1

2

2

1

2

1

10

Stock offers

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total

23

6

8

11

7

10

12

7

84
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offer announcement date, making data insufficient to estimate analysts' response to the
announcement (see section 3.4.2 for why there must be at least seven days allowed from
the takeover announcement date to the first date when I/B/E/S recorded a forecast
revision related to the takeover announcement).
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics o f the target firms in the sample. Overall,
the characteristics (except the target's attitude toward a takeover bid) are similar in cash
offers and combination offers. During the takeover month (i.e. a month subsequent to a
tender-oflfer announcement), the mean value o f the number of revisions of earnings for a
target in a cash offer is 3.64, and the median value is 2. For combination offers, the
mean value of the number of forecast revisions for a target during the takeover month is
3.8, while the median value is 3. For all months excluding months -6 to +6, the
difference in the numbers of revisions of earnings for a target in cash offers and in
combination offers is likewise insignificant. The mean values of forecast revisions for
cash offers and combination offers are 2.7 and 3.6, respectively. The median values for
cash offers and combination offers are the same (i.e., 3). There is, however, a difference
in the target's attitude toward a bid between cash offers and combination offers, hi
seventeen of the 74 cash offers, or 22.97 percent, the target firm resists the takeover
attempts. In contrast, none of the targets in the ten combination offers publicly resist the
bids. Of these 17 hostile cash tender offers, 14 targets (or 82.35 percent) disclose their
disapproval toward the bid within 30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover
announcement. Ofthe ten combination offers, six have sufficient information to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

81
Table 3.2
Descriptive statistics of target firms in the sample
Range

Number o f forecast revisions submitted
by analysts for the target in the
takeover month:
Cash offers
Combination offers

Mean

Median

3.54

2

1

11

3.87

3

1

7

3
3

0
0

38
23

Number o f forecast revisions submitted
by analysts for the target each
month (excluding months -6 to +6):
2.7
Cash offers
Combination offers
3.6

Minimum Maximum

Market value of the target's equity before
the announcement (in $ million):
Cash offers
Combination offers

413.88
406.07

Percentage of value offered for stock
in combination offers where
this percentage is known:
Combination offers

54.56

Percentage of takeover attempts where
the target's management resists the
takeover: Cash offers
Combination offers

22.97 O-e., 17 out of 74)
0.00

Percentage of hostile takeover bids where
the target's attitude toward a bid
is disclosed with 30 calendar days
following the initial takeover bid:
Cash offers
Combination offers

82.35 (i.e., 14 out of 17)
Not applied

115.21
244.36

1.10
34.40

7,690
4,343

50.01

40.00

80.00
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determine the percentage of the dollar value paid for by stock. The mean value of this
percentage is 54.56, while the median value is 51.
Table 3.3 reports the average unexpected forecast revision for the sixteen months
surrounding the takeover announcement for all targets for which forecasts of currentyear earnings are available. Consistent with Brous and Kini (1993), the average
unexpected forecast revision o f earnings for the current forecast-year over the month
following the initial announcement (i.e., event month zero) is significantly positive at the
10 percent level, and 50.7 percent o f revisions are positive (significant at the 5 percent
level based on Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test). Further, Brous and Kini argue that the
measures o f analysts' forecast revisions in their study (and, therefore, in this chapter) are
understated because investment banking and legal fees related to the bid are likely to
incur in the year of a takeover attempt. Thus, the result on revisions of analysts' forecast
of earnings for the current-fiscal year is consistent with the notion that a takeover
announcement conveys favorable information abut the value of the target firm. The
mean and median unexpected forecast revisions for the target in response to the takeover
announcement are 0.015649 and 0.000588, respectively.
Table 3.4 presents monthly revisions of analysts' forecasts o f earnings for the
following- fiscal year, hi contrast to Table 3.3, Table 3.4 does not support the notion
that an takeover announcement conveys information about the value of the target. At
event month 0, neither the mean nor the median value of the unexpected revisions of
following-year earnings forecasts is significantly different from zero at conventional
levels. The insignificant results formed here for the following forecast-year are
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Table 3.3
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 December 1995: All offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date,
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and,
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses,
respectively.
#of
Month obs.
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4

103
97
102
103
111
104
102
102
101
100
94
84
61
38
26
21

Raw
FR

Expected
FR

Mean
UFR

Median
/-value UFR

0.001713
-0.009753
-0.007514
-0.003621
-0.003442
-0.008223
-0.000854
-0.004130
-0.010308
-0.000618
-0.012455
0.012977
-0.014183
-0.011534
-0.002833
-0.010204

-0.007579
0.001183
0.005316
0.004352
-0.000618
-0.003379
-0.002004
-0.003068
-0.002323
-0.001969
-0.001381
-0.002673
0.003593
0.001128
-0.001897
0.001269

0.009292**
-0.010936
-0.012829*
-0.007973
-0.002418
-0.004861
0.001263
-0.001193
-0.008616
0.001261
-0.011842
0.015649*
-0.017775
-0.012662
-0.000936
-0.011473

2.18
-1.02
-1.95
-1.50
-0.49
-1.17
0.17
-0.18
-1.41
0.29
-1.55
1.86
-1.42
-0.77
-0.04
-0.52

0.000357
-0.001030
-0.001159
-0.000421
-0.000459
0.000272
-0.000311
-0.001476
-0.001809
0.000506
-0.002006
0.000588
-0.001462
0.001099
0.000031
0.000777

%
positive
UFR
54.4
46.4
40.2*
48.5
44.6
50.5
47.6
42.3
39.4**
52.9**
36.5**
50.7**
41.2
55.3
50.0
52.4

*, **, and denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.4
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
following forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 December 1995: All offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date,
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and,
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses,
respectively.
#of
Month obs.
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4

76
74
84
78
97
89
92
87
78
85
66
50
31
24
16
17

Raw
FR

Expected
FR

Mean
UFR

Median
/-value UFR

0.021332
0.002215
0.012675
-0.015920
-0.001684
-0.019104
0.003464
0.012873
-0.007027
-0.009683
-0.003857
-0.007277
-0.002490
-0.001466
0.009720
-0.014550

0.002036
-0.002105
0.002426
0.003261
0.003834
-0.003559
-0.000809
-0.006292
-0.001581
-0.001629
0.001033
0.004396
0.000938
0.000495
-0.009813
0.008019

0.002949
0.004321
0.010249
-0.019181’
-0.005519
-0.003633
-0.006957*
0.002315
-0.006104
-0.008251
-0.004858
-0.011673
-0.003428
-0.001961
0.019533
-0.022569**

0.68
0.66
1.22
-1.64
-1.25
-0.33
-1.87
0.36
-1.30
-0.98
-0.53
-0.82
-0.49
-0.39
0.83
-2.69

%
positive
UFR

0.001617 57.1
0.000407 54.1
-0.000606 47.6
-0.004441 38.5
-0.000897 45.4
0.003526 56.7*
-0.003215 41.5**
0.000043 51.1
0.000251 48.1
-0.002052 45.3
-0.000285 47.8
-0.001355 46.0
0.002276 58.1
-0.001814 45.8
0.005800 62.5
__
-0.008465 29.4
.M S

*, **, and ***denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
at two-tailed tests.
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inconsistent with Brous and Kim's (1993) finding of significantly positive unexpected
forecast revisions of earnings for the following forecast-year for tender offers announced
between January 1977 and December 1988. This suggests that the evidence that a
takeover announcement conveys favorable information about the target's value is timespecific.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 provide unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the
current forecast-year for cash tender offers and for tender offers funded through a
combination of cash and stock, respectively. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 reveal little evidence
supportive of the notion that payment method in takeovers conveys information about
the target's value. For cash offers, the average unexpected forecast revision for the
current forecast-year at event month zero (i.e., at the month following the initial
takeover announcement) is significantly positive at the 5 percent level. The proportion
o f positive unexpected forecast revisions for the current forecast-year, however, is not
significantly different from 50 percent. Moreover, for month +1, UFR is significantly
negative and the percent positive is significantly below 50 percent. For combination
offers, none of the average unexpected forecast revisions or the proportion of positive
unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the current forecast-year at the
announcement month is significantly different from zero.
Similarly, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 indicate that unexpected forecast revisions of
earnings for the following forecast-year disaggregated by payment method yield
inconclusive results. Specifically, in cash tender offers, the mean value and proportion of
positive unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the following forecast-year at the
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Table 3.5
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 December 1995: Cash offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date,
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model The null
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and,
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test
and Wflcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses,
respectively.
%

#of
Month obs.
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4

94
85
90
90
98
90
89
90
90
87
84
74
53
29
20
17

Raw
FR

Experted
FR

Mean
UFR

Median
r-vahie UFR

0.002359
-0.005285
-0.007925
-0.006338
-0.002561
-0.008476
-0.007392
-0.008012
-0.010500
-0.004634
0.001772
0.013250
-0.025232
0.007280
-0.025116
-0.010645

-0.007979
-0.003015
0.002757
0.000118
-0.002073
-0.002665
-0.002780
-0.005301
-0.003567
-0.004179
-0.004158
-0.002802
0.002389
-0.002389
0.002827
0.001077

0.010338**
-0.002270
-0.010682*
-0.006456
-0.000020
-0.005834
-0.004704
-0.002947
-0.007648
-0.000650
-0.011189
0.016052**
-0.027621**
0.009669
-0.027943
-0.011722

2.24
-0.27
-1.79
-1.35
-0.00
-1.24
-1.16
-0.42
-1.14
-0.14
-1.31
1.88
-2.05
1.74
-1.54
-0.43

0.000287
-0.001030
-0.001159
-0.000380
-0.000449
-0.000724
0.000278
-0.001571
-0.001597
0.000460
-0.001694
-0.000099
-0.001652
0.001477
-0.002755
0.000814

positive
UFR
54.3
45.9
38.9*'
48.9
44.4
46.2
50.0
41.3
39.8
51.7
37.9
48.4
37.2*
58.6
40.0
58.8

*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.6
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) o f earnings per share for the
current forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 December 1995: Combination offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date,
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and,
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses,
respectively.
#of
Month obs.

Raw
FR

Expected
FR

Mean
UFR

Median
/-value UFR

-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2

-0.005034
-0.041402
-0.004431
0.015183
-0.010145
-0.006580
0.045418
0.025634
-0.008682
0.026872
-0.013652
0.011229
0.045206
-0.072157
0.071446
-0.008331

-0.003406
0.030922
0.024505
0.033659
0.010350
-0.007968
0.003306
0.013677
0.007853
0.012818
0.003677
-0.001844
0.010063
0.012462
-0.017641
0.002083

-0.001627
-0.072324
-0.028936
-0.018476
-0.020495
0.001388
0.042112
0.011957
-0.016536
0.014054
-0.017329**
0.013073
0.035143
-0.084619
0.089086
-0.010414

-0.25
-1.14
-0.84
-0.69
-1.42
0.24
0.82
0.60
-1.45
1.13
-2.26
1.39
1.25
-1.32
1.34
-1.32

-1

0
1
2
3
4

9
12
12
13
13
14
13
12
11
13
10
10
8
9
6
4

0.000938
-0.001386
-0.001326
-0.001338
-0.003382
0.004285
-0.004840
-0.000488
-0.007664
0.004895
-0.017187
0.002408
0.005164
-0.014180
0.018589
-0.009459

%
positive
UFR
55.6
50.0
50.0
46.2
46.2
78.6*
30.8
50.0
36.4*
61.5
30.0**
60.0
62.5
44.4
83.3
25.0

*, **, and denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
at two-tailed tests.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
announcement month are insignificant (with an average value of -0.01591 and a /-value
of -0.99, and a proportion o f positive unexpected revisions equal to 44.2 percent with a
r-value o f -0.39). In combination offers, the average announcement-month unexpected
revision and proportion of positive unexpected revisions are likewise insignificant at the
conventional levels (0.01438 with a /-value of 0.76, and 0.57 percent with a r-value of
0.37, respectively).
A regression analysis framework is used to formally test whether the target's
resistance toward a bid is associated with an unexpected downward revision of analyst
earnings forecasts, and whether payment method in takeover bids conveys information
about the value of the target. The test results are provided in Table 3.9. Consistent with
Brous and Kini's (1993) findings, /'’-values for both regression analyses are insignificant
at the conventional levels (0.59 when the dependent variable is UFRi with respect to the
current forecast-year, and 0.79 when the dependent variable is UFRi with respect to the
following forecast-year, respectively). This means, first, that target's resistance variable
RESISTi is not important in explaining unexpected forecast revisions for either the

current forecast-year or the following forecast-year. In other words, the target's
resistance toward a takeover bid is not associated with unexpected earnings forecast
revisions.
Second, the insignificant F-values for both regression analyses in Table 3.9 also
imply that the payment method variable, METHOD*, is not important in explaining
unexpected forecast revisions of earnings for the current forecast-year and the following
forecast-year at the initial takeover announcement. Thus, the evidence in this study does
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Table 3.7
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
following forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 December 1995: Cash offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date,
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and,
two, the percentage o f positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test
and Wilcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses,
respectively.
%

# of
Month obs.
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4

67
65
72
69
84
78
81
77
70
76
59
43
26
18
12
14

Raw
FR

Expected
FR

Mean
UFR

Median
r-value UFR

0.002407
0.003160
0.000577
-0.010045
-0.004832
-0.009265
-0.008903
0.018308
-0.006659
-0.011778
-0.001335
-0.009830
-0.006931
-0.001932
0.025866
-0.022735

0.000977
-0.005291
-0.002935
-0.001511
0.000176
-0.005504
0.000095
-0.006670
-0.002804
-0.002351
0.000566
0.006085
0.002268
0.000156
-0.007400
0.002099

0.001430
0.008451
0.003512
-0.008534
-0.005008
-0.003761
-0.008966**
0.006015
-0.004573
-0.009674
-0.001823
-0.015915
-0.009199
-0.002087
0.033266
-0.024834**

0.30
1.21
0.59
-1.60
-1.20
-0.30
-2.26
0.96
-0.93
-1.03
-0.18
-0.99
-1.27
-0.44
1.19
-2.57

0.001481
0.000517
-0.000295
-0.004907
-0.000941
0.003590
-0.003574
0.000043
0.000251
-0.002159
0.000206
-0.001369
0.001477
-0.001814
0.002414
-0.010504

positive
UFR
55.2
55.4
48.6
37.7“
42.9
57.7
39.0*
51.3
47.9
42.9
51.7
44.2
53.8
44.4
58.3
21.4*

*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.8
Monthly average unexpected forecast revisions (UFR) of earnings per share for the
following forecast-year for the takeover announcements made over January 1988 December 1995: Combination offers
Each event month is a 30-day interval, relative to event month zero. Event month zero
is defined as the 30-day interval, (+7, +36), relative to the takeover announcement date,
as described in section 3.4.2. FR denotes forecast revisions. The unexpected forecast
revisions, UFR, are calculated by using a fourth-order moving average model. The null
hypotheses are, one, the average unexpected earnings forecast revision equals zero, and,
two, the percentage of positive unexpected forecast revisions equals 50 percent, t test
and Wflcoxon signed ranks test are used to test the first and second hypotheses,
respectively.
#of
Month obs.

Raw
FR

Expected
FR

Mean
UFR

Median
/-value UFR

-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4

0.148128
-0.004605
0.085266
-0.060963
0.018654
-0.083060
0.087972
-0.029516
-0.010380
0.008239
-0.025473
0.008403
0.020603
-0.000068
-0.038719
0.023648

0.009132
0.020900
0.034597
0.039846
0.027471
0.009081
-0.006907
-0.003344
0.009124
0.004467
0.004968
-0.005984
-0.005976
0.001513
-0.017054
0.035648

0.014259
-0.025505
0.050669
-0.100809
-0.008817
-0.002726
0.007842
-0.026172
-0.019504
0.003772
-0.030441
0.014387
0.026579
-0.001581
-0.021665
-0.012000

1.56
-1.69
1.09
-1.09
-0.45
-0.30
0.76
-0.92
-1.24
0.51
-1.73
0.76
1.65
-0.10
-0.53
-0.70

9
9
12
9
13
11
11
10
8
9
7
7
5
6
4
3

0.002706
-0.006091
-0.001761
-0.000388
0.001828
0.000113
0.003505
-0.001937
-0.001573
0.010600
-0.012973
0.001563
0.017461
0.004482
0.014506
0.001586

%
positive
UFR
70.0
44.4*
41.7
44.4
61.5
50.0
58.3
50.0
50.0
66.7
14.3*
57.1
80.0
50.0
75.0
66.7

\ **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
at two-tailed tests.
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Table 3.9
Estimated coefficients o f regressions for revisions of analysts' forecasts o f earnings for
takeover bids over the period January 1988 to December 1995
The f-values are in parentheses. The regression model tested is:
UFR/ — cto + a i METHOD; + ct2RESISTf+- £/

where

(26)

unexpected forecast revision for target i at takeover
announcement;
METHODj = 1 for an offer funded through stock or a combination of
cash and stock; 0 for a cash offer,
RESIST; = 1 if the target's management is opposed to the bid within
30 calendar days subsequent to the initial takeover
announcement; and 0 otherwise;
£/
=
statistical error term.
UFR/

=

Dependent variable
UFR; with respect to
current fbrecast-year

UFR, with respect to
following forecast-year

Intercept

0.0245*
(1.75)

0.031**
(1.99)

METHOD;

-0.011
(-0.35)

-0.020
(-0.56)

RESIST;

-0.027
(-1.08)

-0.033
(-1.22)

F-value
I?
Number of
observations

0.59
0.02

0.79
0.02

84

50

* and **denote statistical significance at the ten and five percent levels, respectively, for
two-tailed tests.
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not support the notion that the method of payment in takeover bids conveys information
about the value of the targets.
3.7. Conclusions
This chapter empirically tests whether the payment method in takeovers conveys
information about the value o f the target firms. This study does not use the targets'
share price reactions to takeover announcements because o f the presence of tax effect
associated with the method o f payment. Rather, this paper uses analyst earnings
forecasts as a proxy for the expected value o f the targets to test the information
hypothesis (with respect to the targets) of the medium of exchange in takeovers.
Empirical tests in this study yield two major results. First, no evidence is found
supportive of the notion that the method o f payment in takeover bids conveys
information about the value of the targets. Unexpected analyst forecast revisions for
tender offers funded through a combination o f stock and cash are not significantly
different from those for cash offers. This suggests that the market perceives that the
information, if any, revealed by payment method in takeovers is not about the value of
the target firms.
Second, inconsistent with the prior study ofBrous and Kini (1993), takeover
announcements result in analysts revising upward their earnings forecasts for the targets
for the current forecast-year, but not for the following forecast-year. Moreover, the
upward revision is statistically significant for cash offers but not for others. The
inconsistency with Brous and Kini suggests that prior study’s result that the market
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perceives a takeover bid to convey favorable information about the target's value is timespecific.
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Chapter 4
Changes in Payment Terms in the Takeover Process
4.1. Introduction
This chapter analyzes how changes in the medium of exchange in the takeover
process affect the value of the bidder's common shares. Two major hypotheses are
proposed to analyze changes in the terms o f exchange: (1) there is information revealed
about the value of the firm in announcements of changes in payment terms, and (2) there
is a wealth transfer between shareholders o f the bidder and those o f the target.
This chapter finds that after controlling for the change in takeover premium,
bidders' share price reactions to announcements of increases in the cash component as a
percentage of the acquisition price are generally more favorable than those to
announcements o f increases in the stock component. An increase in the cash component,
on average, generates approximately two percent announcement-period excess return to
bidders, relative to an increase in the stock component. This is generally consistent with
Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory that the market views the decision to issue common
shares to finance investment projects as unfavorable information about the value of the
issuing firms. There is no evidence to support the view that the market's re-evaluation of
the bidder's shares upon announcements of revisions of payment terms is a result of any
concurrent changes in takeover premium.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a
theoretical discussion and the empirical hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the method of
94
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analysis. Section 4.4 explains the data used in this study. Section 4.5 presents empirical
results. Conclusions are provided in section 4.6.
4.2. Theoretical discussion and empirical hypotheses
Previous studies by Myers and Mqhif (1984) and Roll (1986) suggest how the
market should react to changes in payment terms: the information hypothesis and the
wealth transfer hypothesis, respectively.
The information hypothesis indicates that the market alters its valuation of the
bidder's common shares based on information inferred from a bidders' decision to revise
the payment terms. This argument builds on Myers and Majlufs (1984) theory that the
market views the use of common stock to finance investment projects as unfavorable
information about the value of issuing firms. Accordingly, in corporate takeovers,
announcements of increases in the stock component as a percentage of acquisition price
for the target convey negative information about the value o f the bidder's shares. The
market would revise downward these bidders' share prices. Conversely, announcements
of increases in the cash component reveal the bidder managers' belief that the bidder’s
common shares are at least not overvalued in the market. Thus, the market would on
average revise upward these bidders' share prices upon these announcements.
The wealth transfer hypothesis views changes in payment terms as a byproduct of
revisions in the overall takeover process. Revision in terms can arise because, for
example, a hostile bidder perceives an increase in the effectiveness of the target's
resistance. Another reason for changes in terms would be the entry of other bidders,
which are likely to bid up the takeover premium for the target. Thus, changes in
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payment terms per se might not convey any information about the value of firms in
takeovers but represent bidder firms conceding more of the expected gains from the
acquisition to the target's shareholders to increase the probability of a successful bid.
Roll (1986) argues that a large portion o f announcement excess returns for target firms
in takeovers is a wealth transfer to the target from the bidder, the result of the bidder's
overoptimistic view of its abilities to manage the target firm. Thus, the wealth transfer
hypothesis predicts that changes in the market value of the bidder at announcements of
changes in payment terms would be a negative function of changes in the takeover
premium.
4 J . Method of analysis
4.3.1. Measuring the announcement excess returns
4.3.1.1. Event study method
Share price reactions to announcements of changes in the medium of exchange in
takeovers are measured by the standard market model event study method as described
in Brown and Warner (198S). Under the assumption of semi-strong form market
efficiency, the procedure provides an estimate of how the market interprets the
information contained in the announcement o f a change in the payment terms o f a
takeover bid.
Consistent with the procedure used elsewhere in this dissertation, the estimation
period for the market model parameters spans a 200-trading-day period ( from 250 days
before through 51 days before the event's first appearance date in the Wall Street
Journal). The parameters of the market model are estimated by regressing individual
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daily returns on the corresponding equal-weighted daily market index returns:
RJt=aj + bjRm + fy

(27)

where:
Rjt = rate o f return for security j on day t,
Rmt -

rate of return for the market index on day t,

aj -

mean return not explained by the market,

bj -

security j's sensitivity to the market's return,

fy =

the statistical error.

All returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
The predicted return for a firm on a day in the event period is the return
predicted by the market model on that day, using the estimates of a,- and bj from the preevent estimation period. That is, the predicted return for security j on day t in the event
window is:
Rjt —Qj + bjRm

(28)

The prediction error for security j on day t in the event window is then defined
as:
PEft—Rft~ Rjt

(29)

The cumulative prediction error for security j over the event window t = tt to t2 is
calculated as:
ti
c pe imm1=

t=t\
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The share price reaction for the bidding firms that announce changes in payment
terms is estimated by calculating the average daily prediction error, APE, for all bidders
on dayf:
A P E , = - ^ - f l P&
M

(31)

j= l

where N is the number o f bidders in the sample.
The cumulative average prediction error (CAPE) over an event-window (t= t\ to
fe) is the sum o f the daily average prediction errors:
CAPE = £ APEt

(32)

t= n

The price reaction to the announcement is the CAPE estimated over the two-day event
window (t= -1,0).
To test whether the CAPE of a sample is significantly different from zero, the test
statistic is obtained by dividing the CAPE by the square root of the product of the
estimation-period variance and the number of days in the CAPE event-window (//, t2).
The test statistic is distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis that the CAPE is
equal to zero if the APE are independent, identically distributed, and normal.
4.3.I.2. Robustness of measuring excess returns: mean- and market-adjusted
returns
As in the earlier chapter, the sensitivity o f the results to the event study
procedure based on the market model is examined by repeating the analysis using both
mean- and market-adjusted returns to calculate prediction errors obtained. The use of
mean-adjusted returns eliminates the problem of specification of risk factors of stock
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returns in the standard event-study method. The use o f market-adjusted returns
addresses the problem of controlling for market-wide price movements on the
announcement date.
4.3.2. Cross-sectional regression analysis
The following regression analysis framework is used to analyze changes in
payment method in takeovers:
CPE, = 0o + Pi STOCK, + pz AP, + fc AP, •STOCK, + e ,

(33)

where:
CPE, =

two-day (-1,0) cumulative excess returns earned by the
bidding firm at announcement i,

A P,

=

changes in acquisition price as a percentage o f the market
value of the bidder's equity prior to announcement /,

STOCK, -

1 for an increase in the stock component as a percentage
of the acquisition price; and 0 otherwise.

The bidder's market capitalization is used as the denominator in calculating A P, because
the dependent variable, CPEi is measured as a percentage (i.e., stock returns) on the
bidder's equity.
An interaction term, AP,»STOCKh is included in the analysis to capture the
effects o f changes in terms on the probability of success o f the offer. Increases in the
takeover premium are, naturally, likely to increase the probability of the success o f an
offer, hi addition, Huang and Walkling (1987) and Wansley, Lane, and Yang (1983)
note that the bidder in stock offers must submit a registration statement and obtain
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approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission before it can offer new shares
to the target's shareholders. Thus, the use o f all cash as the method of payment reduces
the tune necessary to complete the takeover process. In a hostile bid, fester transactions
give the target management less chance and time to implement takeover defense, such as
soliciting a white knight (Le., a friendly and late-entiy bidder). Offers involving stock
are, therefore, likely to have a lower possibility of takeover success than are all cash
offers. By extrapolation (and consistent with some market folklore), increases in the
cash component o f an offer would raise the probability of success o f that bid. Thus, if
the method o f payment influences the probability of success of an offer, changes in the
payment terms also are likely to influence that probability. Since any share price effect
on the bidder from changes in acquisition price reflects both the wealth transfer effect (as
above) and the probability of takeover success, the regression includes the interaction
term.
The test of the empirical hypotheses described in section 4.2 is equivalent to the
tests of coefficients

and fc in equation (21). That is, the information hypothesis

predicts 3i will be negative, while the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts 3 2 will be
negative. If changes in the payment terms change the influence of the wealth transfer
effect for increases in stock (by changing the probability of success, as argued), then the
sign o f 3s will indicate the direction of that interactive effect.
4.4. Data
The sample of announcements of changes in payment method come from two
sources: (1) the 348 takeover announcements from January 1989 to December1995 as
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described in the second chapter, and (2) searches of the Lexis/Nexis database. The
Lexis/Nexis database is searched for combinations o f keywords "changeS", "alterS",
"revisS", "modify", "modifies", "modified", "payment method", "medium o f exchange",
"cash and stock", "combination", "all-cash", and "all-stock” to generate a sample of
takeover announcements. After elimination o f all obviously unrelated announcements,
the remaining announcements are checked against the Wall Street Journal to identify
announcements of changes in payment terms in takeovers. In addition, to be included in
the sample, the bidders must have stock return data on the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database over a 250-day period prior to the announcement date
so that the market reaction to an announcement can be estimated. Partial acquisitions
are excluded from the sample. The process above yields the final sample of 30
announcements of revisions of the medium o f exchange in corporate takeovers made
over the period January 1976 to December 1995.
4.5. Empirical results
4.5.1. Distribution of the sample
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics. Panel A reports the distribution of the
thirty announcements of changes in the medium of exchange in takeovers made over the
period January 1976 to December 1995. Twenty announcements report increases in the
cash component as a percentage of acquisition price, while ten announcements report
increases in the stock component. Of these thirty announcements, in three the bidders
revise the payment terms twice (see Table 4.5 for details of the announcements). To
estimate how often the payment terms in takeovers are altered, these thirty
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Table 4.1
Summary statistics for the sample o f announcements of changes in payment terms in
corporate takeovers made over the period January 1976 to December 1995
Panel A: Distribution of announcements o f changes in payment terms by years
Year

1976

1978

1979 1980

1983

1984

1985

1986 1987

Increase
instock

0

2

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

Increase
in cash

2

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

2

Year

1989

1988

1990

1991

1992

1993 1994

1995

Total over
1976-1995

Increase
instock

1

2

0

2

0

0

0

0

10

Increase
in cash

2

0

2

2

2

1

1

1

20

Panel B: Payment methods before and after announcements of changes in payment terms
Combination offers
\

New hiri
Cash
offers

Increase in
cash portion

Not applied

Not applied

Combo offers

9

Stock offers
Total

Initial b i d \
Cash offers

Increase in
stock portion

Stock
offers

Total

2

2

4

5

3

3

20

3

3

Not applied

12

8

5

Not applied
5

6

30
(table con'd)
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Panel C: Characteristics of announcements of changes in payment terms in takeovers
made over the period January 1976 to December 199S
Range
Mean

Median Minimum

The market value o f the bidder's equity
prior to the announcement of
changes in payment terms
(in million dollars)
3,497.64 402.71
Changes in takeover premium
(in miffion dollars)

30.03

Changes in takeover premium divided by
the market value of the bidder's
equity
0.0067

7.52

Maximum

39,180.63

0.00

-75.20

853.73

0.00

-0.0859

0.2422

Panel D: A description o f the nature of the takeover bids
COMPET takes a value o f one if there are more than one bidders for an announcement
of changes in payment terms; and zero otherwise. RESIST equals one if the target's
management publicly resist the takeover bid; and zero otherwise.
Number of announcements

Percentage of the entire sample

COMPET = 1

2

6.67%

RESIST =1

9

30.0%
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announcements are checked against the 324 takeover announcements used in the second
chapter. Results reveal that of the 30 announcements o f changes in payment terms, eight
also appear in the 324 announcements used in the second chapter. Thus, roughly
speaking, 2.50 percent (Le., 8 / 324) of all takeover announcements involving publicly
traded firms experience revisions of payment terms.
Panel B o f Table 4.1 reports the distribution of changes in payment terms in
takeovers disaggregated by how the payment terms are altered. Two features are
noteworthy. First, out of all the 30 announcements in the final sample, 20 (= 12 + 8 )
announcements, or 66.67 percent, experience increases in the cash component as a
percentage o f the acquisition price. Second, of 20 announcements with a combination of
cash and stock as the initial payment method, 14 (= 9 + 5) takeovers, or 70 percent, shift
toward more cash payment. Thus, provided that changes in payment terms are
warranted, the decisions on changes are asymmetric: changes in the medium of exchange
in takeovers during the sample period tend to be increases in the cash component, or
equivalently, decreases in the stock component.
The mean values of selected characteristics o f the announcements are presented
in Panel C ofTable 4.1. Of the thirty announcements, in 14 announcements ( 1 1 and 3
involving increases in the cash and stock components, respectively) changes in the cash
component (and thus the stock component) as a percentage of the acquisition price can
be determined. The percentage of changes in payment terms for remaining 16 (= 30 14) announcements cannot be determined because, for example, their payment terms
involve convertibles or preferred stock. The changes in payment terms for these 14
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announcements where the stock and cash components are known are substantial
Specifically, the mean value of changes in terms for the 11 cash-increase announcements
is 47.95 percentage points increases in the cash component; the median value is 51.44
percentage points. Bidders in the 3 stock-increase announcements increase the stock
component by 45,100, and 100 percentage points, respectively.
Panel C of Table 4.1 also reports that the mean size o f the bidder's market
capitalization prior to the announcement of changes in payment terms is $ 3.50 billion
and the median value is S 402.71. The mean value o f changes in takeover premium is S
30.03 million and the median value is zero. The last row of Panel C shows that the
average change in the acquisition price is very small relative to the market value of the
bidder. The mean ratio of changes in acquisition price to the bidder's market
capitalization prior to the announcement is 0.0067; while the median ratio is zero.
Panel D of Table 4.1 provides additional information about the nature of the
takeover bids. In nine of the thirty, announcements o f changes in payment terms, the
target management publicly resists the takeover bid. Bidders in five of these nine
contested offers increase the cash component in the payment terms. Thus, target
resistance does not seem to favor increases in one medium over the other. In addition,
only two of thirty, takeovers involve more than one bidder as disclosed by the Wall
Street Journal. Both o f these involve a switch to all-cash offers from offers funded
through a combination o f cash and stock. The sample is too small for any conclusions,
but this result is consistent with Fishman's (1989) argument and market folklore that cash
is used to preclude or defeat other bidders.
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4.5.2. Share price reactions to announcements of changes in payment terms and
regression results
Table 4.2 reports the bidder's share price reactions to announcements of revisions
of payment terms disaggregated by changes in takeover premium and changes in
payment terms. Holding the change in takeover premium constant, the bidder's
announcement-period excess returns in cash offers are generally more favorable than
those in stock offers. Specifically, when the cash component is increased but the
takeover premium remains unchanged, the mean announcement-period excess returns to
bidder is 2.18 percent, significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (p-value =
0.0138); the median value is 1.81 percent, hi contrast, the bidders who decrease the
cash component (or, equivalently, increase the stock component) but do not change the
takeover premium experience insignificant announcement excess returns. When there is
an increase in the cash component and a decrease in takeover premium, the bidders
experience, on average, a 3.81 percent excess return, significant at the 10 percent level
On spite of only 4 observations in this group), hi comparison, the announcement excess
returns to bidders who decrease both cash component and takeover premium are
insignificant at the conventional levels. The evidence on bidders who increase both the
stock component and the acquisition price is less clear. The average announcement
excess return to these bidders is not significantly different from zero (the median value is
- 0.55 percent), a result not supportive of the information hypothesis and the wealth
transfer hypothesis. The number of observations for this group o f bidders, however, is
only two.

:i

I!
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Table 4.2
Announcement cumulative excess returns disaggregated by changes in payment terms
and o f takeover premium
P-values o f f-tests are in parentheses. The first, second, and third numbers in square
brackets are the median value o f announcement excess returns, the number of bidders
with positive announcement excess returns, and the number of bidders, respectively.
Changes in payment terms
Increase in
stock component

Increase in
cash component

Sub-sample
0 .0 0 %

Increase in
takeover
premium

-0.55%
(0.8655)
[-0.55% , 1,2]

%
(0.8931)
[0.16%, 3, 5]

(0.9986)
[0.16%, 4, 7]

Decrease in
takeover
premium

-0 .6 6 %
(0.8782)
[-0 .6 6 %, 1 , 2 ]

3.81 %*
(0.0803)
[4.20 %, 4,4]

2.32%
(0.2037)
[2.93%, 5, 6 ]

No change
in takeover
premium

-0.32 %
(0.6914)
[0.32%, 3, 6 ]

2.18%**
(0.0138)
[1.81 %, 9, 11]

1.30%**
(0.0494)
[0.93%, 12, 17]

Sub-sample

-0.44%
(0.5881)
[0.32%, 5, 10]

0 .2 2

2 .0 1 %***

(0.0058)
[2.28%, 16, 2 0 ]

*, **, and ***indicate statistical significance at the
in two-tailed tests.

1 0 ,5,

and 1 percent levels, respectively,
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Table 4.3 presents an ANOVA test examining changes in variance based on the
directions o f changes in payment terms and changes in acquisition price. As argued
above, an interaction term is included to capture the effects o f changes in payment terms
on the probability o f the success of an offer. The overall test yields an F-value 2.53,
significant at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the effect o f increases in the stock
component (measured as a category) on bidders' two-day announcement excess returns
is significantly negative at the 5 percent level (F-value 6.26). No supporting evidence of
either the effect of changes in the acquisition price or the interactive effect is found.
Because changes in acquisition price are continuous, a multivariate regression
framework is used to examine whether changes in the medium of exchange in takeovers
convey information about the bidder's value. The announcement-period is defined as a
two-day event window (days -1 and 0 ) because it is possible that announcements are
made after the markets close. Changes in acquisition price are measured as a continuous
number rather than a discrete number as in the ANOVA test above.
The regression results, presented in Table 4.4, are consistent with the ANOVA
results. After controlling for concurrent changes in takeover premium, bidders' share
price reactions to announcements of increases in the cash component are more favorable
than those for increases in the stock component. No evidence is found in support of the
notion that a wealth transfer between bidder and target explains the bidder's share price
reactions to announcements o f changes in the medium of exchange. Specifically, the
second column ofTable 4.4 reports coefficient estimates using market-model cumulative
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Table 4.3
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for announcements of changes in payment terms in
takeovers from January 1976 to December 1995
APRC is defined as changes in acquisition price for announcement i and takes three
levels (i.e., no change, increase, or decrease in acquisition price) in the ANOVA test.
STOCKtakts a value of one for an increase in the stock component as a percentage of
acquisition price for the target; and zero otherwise.
Degrees of
freedom

Source of
variance

Sum o f
squares

STOCK

0.00365422

1

6.26**

APRC

0.00155200

2

1.33

0.00164607

2

1.41

STOCK-APRC

F-value

Overall test F-value = 2.53*
* and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 and 5 percent levels, respectively, in
two-tailed tests.

/
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prediction errors, CPEs, as the dependent variable. The overall test of the null hypothesis
Pi=32 = 03 = 0 is not rejected at the 10 percent leveL The indicator variable, STOCK,
which takes a value of one for an increase in the stock component as a percentage of
acquisition price for the target and zero otherwise, is significantly negative at the

10

percent level (/-value = -1.935). The intercept estimate, 1.7 percent (f-value = 3.047),
can be interpreted as the average announcement excess returns to bidders who increase
the cash-stock ratio in payment method (i.e., STOCK - 0) but do not change the overall
value of the acquisition price for the target (thus, AP —0). The estimates of the
coefficients for other independent variables, A Pt and interaction term AP^STOCK,, are
not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. Thus, there is no evidence
supportive of a wealth transfer between bidder and target as an explanation for bidder
excess returns at the announcement of changes in payment terms. A possible reason for
the insignificant result on the wealth transfer hypothesis is that the average change in
acquisition price is very small relative to the market value o f the bidder. As indicated in
Panel C of Table 4.1, the mean value of changes in acquisition price divided by the
market value of the bidder's equity is only 0.0067; while the median value is zero.
Because the dependent variable in the multivariate regression analysis is measured as
two-day announcement cumulative prediction errors, CPEs, it is likely that the relatively
imprecise measurement o f CPEs (because o f for example, bid-ask spreads) explains the
insignificant results on the wealth transfer hypothesis.
The regression equation estimated in Table 4.4 predicts a significant and positive
share price response to an announcement of an increase in the cash component (i.e., +1.7
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percent with a /rvalue o f0.0052), but an insignificant share price reaction for an increase
in the stock component (-0.2 percent -1 .7 - 1.9 percent, / 7-value = 0.73) in the absence
of changes in takeover premium. One possible explanation for this result is that
increases in the stock component likely reflect both the signaling effect and the
investment effect from a takeover. Revisions o f payment terms can increase this
investment effect by enhancing the probability o f takeover success through catering to
the needs of the target's shareholders (for example, the tax considerations) or to those of
the target's management (for example, the concern o f target managerial ownership,
Stulz, 1988). To control for this investment effect, announcements of increases in the
cash component must be used as a baseline against which those of increases in the stock
component are analyzed. Accordingly, the result in Table 4.4 that STOCK is
significantly negative indicates that the market infers the choice of changes in payment
terms (i.e., an increase in either the cash or the stock component) as indicative o f the
bidder's belief whether the bidder's shares are overpriced in the market.
To examine whether the results are sensitive to how the excess returns are
measured, the market- and mean-adjusted returns are also used to calculate CPEs for the
dependent variable. The use of market-adjusted returns takes account of potential
market-wide price movements at the announcement dates; while the use of meanadjusted returns avoids the specifications o f risk factors o f stock returns. Columns 3 and
4 of Table 4.4 present the regression results using announcement-period market- and
mean-adjusted returns to generate CPEs. The findings are similar to those using the
market model CPE as the dependent variable and show the results are robust to the
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Tabic 4.4
Regression analysis for announcements o f changes in payment terms in takeovers over
the period January 1976 to December 1995
Dependent variable is CPE,, two-day cumulative excess returns earned by the bidding
firm at announcement i. A P , is defined as changes in takeover premium as a percentage
ofthe bidder's market capitalization prior to announcement i. STOCKitakes a value of
one for an increase in the stock component as a percentage of acquisition price for the
target; and zero otherwise. Market-adjusted CPE uses value-weighted CRSP index
returns for obtaining cumulative excess returns, f-vahies are in parentheses.
The regression model analyzed is the following;
CPE, » fo + faSTO CK, + fc A P , + fo A P , •STOCK, + e»
Market model
CPE
Intercept

Market-adjusted
CPE

(33)

Mean-adjusted
CPE
0 .0 2 0 ***

0.017***
(3.047)

0.017***
(3.076)

(3.321)

STOCK,

-0.019*
(-1.935)

-0 .0 2 0 **
(-2.056)

-0.023**
(-2.132)

A P,

-0.197
(-1.438)

-0.167
(- 1 .2 2 2 )

-0.189
(-1.260)

AP,•STOCK,

0.093
(0.548)

0.092
(0.541)

0.103
(0.558)

F

2.581*

2.327*

2.493*

R2

0.23

0 .2 1

0 .2 2

Adjusted R2

0.14

0 .1 2

0.13

Number of
observations

30

30

30

*, **, and ***indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively,
in two-tailed tests.
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alternative calculations of CPEs. Only STOCK and the intercept exhibit coefficient
estimates significantly different from zero at conventional (5 and 1 percents,
respectively) levels.
4.6. Conclusions
A small portion of corporate takeovers experiences revisions of their payment
terms. This chapter presents evidence about the effects of equity issuance within the
framework of changes in payment method in takeovers. Two issues are addressed in this
chapter one, whether the market infers inform ation about the value of the bidders from
the decision to revise the terms o f payment, and two, whether the market re-evaluations
o f bidders' common shares upon announcements of revisions of payment terms are a
result o f a wealth transfer between bidder and target. The results indicate that, after
controlling for the effect of changes in takeover premium, bidder's share price reactions
to announcements of increases in the cash component are generally more favorable than
those for increases in the stock component. The relatively unfavorable bidder's share
price reactions to announcements involving increases in the stock component is not
related to changes in takeover premium accompanying revisions of payment terms.
Cross-sectionally, the decision to increase the stock component in the offer generates a
statistically significant and negative 1.9 percent excess returns to bidders, relative to
announcements of increasing the cash component. Thus, the evidence is generally
consistent with Myers and Majlufs (1984) model that the market believes that corporate
management, acting in the best interests of shareholders, will not issue common shares
unless managers believe the firm's shares to be overvalued.
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Table 4.5. Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over the period January 1976 to December 1995
The stated or inferred reasons for changes in payment method are in parentheses. The first and second numbers in the square brackets are the
percentages of a combination offer funded by cash and stock, respectively. No such percentages are assigned for a combination offer if the terms are
too complicated to determine the percentages of cash and stock in a combination offer (for example, the offer involves convertible debts as payment
method).

Bidder firm

Original bid

New bid

Bidding
war ?

Public resistance
to the initial bid ?

Changes in
takeover premium ?

Coca-Cola Enterprises

Combination
Stock
[51.44%, 48.56%]
No
No
Decrease
(Analysts suggested that the target's business conditions were worse than they were a few months ago.)

Xonics Inc.

Stock
Combination
No
Yes
No
(The bidder was in final negotiations with the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the investigation of
possible securities violations.)

Mercantile National
Combination
(No reason was given.)
Consolidated Foods

Combination and
an increase in cash

No

No

No

Combination and
Combination
an increase in cash
No
No
No
(Under the new offer, the family controlling the target would receive cash rather than a combination of cash and
securities previously announced.)
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S

Bidder firm
Florida National Banks
of Florida Inc.

Original bid

New bid

Bidding
war ?

Public resistance
to the initial bid ?

Changes in
takeover premium ?

Combination
Cash
(No reason was given.)

No

No

No

Monumental Corp.

Combination
Cash
(No reason was given,)

No

No

Increase

Sun Banks Inc.

Combination
Combination
[40%, 60%]
[45%, 55%]
No
No
No
(The change was made because the bidder management believed that bidder's shares were undervalued.)

Damson Oil Corp.

Combination
Cash
Yes
No
No
(The Wall Street Journal described as "novel" the initial payment method, which called for 25 percent of the
target's shares to be paid for by securities whose payoffs were contingent on the bidder's subsidiary.)

GAF Corp.

Combination
Cash
No
Yes
No
(Sources said that the move was partly intended to frustrate the target's attempt to install a "poison pill".)

Turner Broadcasting
Systems Inc.

Cash
Combination
No
No
(The bidder management indicated that it could not raise financing for the initial all-cash offer.)

No

(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements o f changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 1995

Bidder firm

Unisys Corp.

Original bid

New bid

Combination
[40%, 60%]
Cash
(No reason was given.)

Bidding
war ?

No

Public resistance
to the initial bid ?

Changes in
takeover premium ?

No

No

Acmat Corp.

Combination
Stock
[33.9%, 66.1%]
No
No
Increase
(The target did not respond to the initial stock offer. The bidder sweetened the offer and altered the payment
method.)

Acmat Corp.

Combination
[33,9%, 66.1%]
Cash
No
No
Decrease
(The bidder revised, again, the offer. The new cash offer had a slightly lower market value than the previous
combination offer.)

PacifiCoip

Combination
Stock
No
Yes
No
(The bidder argued that the package was altered because the target's assets were deeply impaired.)

PacifiCorp

Stock
Cash
No
Yes
Increase
(This second-time modification of the terms was intended to make the deal as easy to understand as possible.)
(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S

Bidder firm

Original bid

New bid

Bidding
war 7

Public resistance
to the initial bid ?

in
takeover premium ?

Combination
[91.11%, 8.89%]
Cash
Yes
Yes
(The bidder stepped up its efforts to acquire the target by launching an all-cash tender offer.)

Increase

Combination and
Combination
a decrease in cash
No
No
(The terms were changed because the bidder's annual revenues were lower than expected.)

Decrease

Bankers Trust of South
Carolina

Convertible
Preferred stock
preferred
No
No
(The bidder re-submitted its offer after the bidder withdrew the initial bid without elaboration.)

No

Bankers Trust of South
Carolina

Convertible
preferred
Stock
No
(No reason was given on this second-time revision in payment method.)

No

Tyson Foods Inc.

Healthcare Services Group

American Telephone &
Telegraph Co.

Vidmark Inc.

No

Cash
Stock
No
Yes
No
(The bidder switched from a cash tender offer to a "friendly" merger as the target management eventually agreed to
talk with the bidder about the offer.)
Stock
Cash
No
(No information concerning the reasons was disclosed.)

No

No

(table con'd)
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S

Bidder firm
House of Fabric Inc.

SuperValu Inc.

Original bid

New bid

Bidding
war ?

Public resistance
to the initial bid 7

Cash
Stock
No
Yes
(The initial hostile tender offer ended up with a mutually-agreed stock offer.)

Changes in
takeover premium ?
Increase

Combination
Combination and
[92,35%, 7.63%]
an increase in cash
No
No
Decrease
(The Wall Street Journal suggested that changes in the terms might be related to a shift in the competition in the
target's industry.)

International Family
Entertainment Inc.

Combination and
Combination
an increase in cash
No
No
No
(The move was intended to give the target's shareholders more choices concerning the payment method.)

International Family
Entertainment Inc.

Combination
[75%, 25%]
Cash
No
No
No
(The bidder launched an all-cash tender offer out of concern over other companies gaining more control of the
target through the purchase of the target's shares in the open market, The target in this announcement differs from
that in the announcement above.)

California Energy Co.

Combination
[71,43%, 28.57%]
Cash
No
Yes
(The bidder escalated its efforts to acquire the target by raising the bid.)

Increase

(table con'd)

00
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Description for 30 announcements of changes in payment method over January 1976 to December 199S

Bidder firm
James River Corp.

McCaw Cellular
Communications Inc.

American International
Group Inc,

Old Kent Financial Corp.

Original bid

New bid

Bidding
war ?

Public resistance
to the initial bid 7

Combo and
Combination
an increase in stock
No
No
(Changes in the offer were to reflect modifications of the target’s asset disposition.)

Changes in
takeover premium ?

Decrease

Cash
Combination
No
Yes
Increase
(Changes in terms were made subsequent to unfavorable court ruling on the target in an unrelated litigation. The
bidder, first, reduced the dollar value, but not the payment method, of the initial offer, The target rebuffed the
bidder’s move. The bidder, then, raised the bid and altered the payment method,)

Stock
Cash
No
No
No
(No official reason was given. The bidder switched to a cash tender offer from a stock-swap offer.)
Combination
[45%, 55%]
Stock
No
No
No
(The bidder believed that majority of the target's shareholders would rather receive stock instead of cash because of
tax considerations.)
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the information theories of
the medium of exchange in takeovers. Previous evidence supports the notion that the
market, on average, revises downward the bidders' share prices upon announcements of
equity-financed takeovers because the market interprets that managers would not use
common stock to finance takeovers unless these managers believe their firms' shares to
be overvalued in the market This dissertation extends this argument by integrating the
theory o f financial intermediation into takeover literature. Consistent with the theory of
financial intermediation, the evidence in this dissertation indicates that outside agents,
particularly commercial banks, certify and monitor the bidder's decision to issue common
stock to finance a takeover. In stock offers, the bidder's announcement excess returns
are positively related to bidder's commercial banking relationship. The evidence on other
financial intermediaries, such as accounting firms and investment banks, is not found.
Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that the medium of exchange
in takeovers conveys information about elements other than the bidders' value: i.e., the
targets' value or the synergy from a takeover. This dissertation examines whether the
medium o f exchange conveys information about the value of the targets by testing
whether revisions o f analysts' forecasts of earnings for the targets in cash tender offers
differ from those in tender offers involving stock as the method of payment. Crosssectional results indicate that the forecast revisions in response to announcements of cash
120
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takeover bids are similar to those in reaction to announcements of takeover attempts
involving stock as the method o f payment. Thus, the evidence suggests that if there is
any information conveyed by the medium of exchange in takeovers, the information is
unlikely to be about the value o f the target's common shares.
The results based on changes in the medium of exchange in takeovers
corroborate the argument that the choice of the method of payment conveys information
about the value of the bidder's shares to the market. Parallel to Wansley, Lane, and
Yang's (1987) finding that bidders earn more favorable excess returns in cash takeovers
than in stock-financed takeovers, announcements of altering the medium of exchange in
takeovers convey information about the value o f the bidder's common shares. After
controlling for changes in the takeover premium which accompany the revisions of
payment terms, bidders' excess returns are approximately two percent higher for
increases in the cash component (as a percentage of the acquisition price) than for
increases in the stock component.
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Appendix
The purpose of Goldfeld-Quandt test is to determine whether there exists
heteroscedasticity in error terms in equation (19). Such a heteroscedasticity occurs
when variances of stock returns vary across firms. Specifically, when the diagonal
elements of^=[ei ez —e>j]'«[ei 0 2 ... e^] are not all identical, heteroscedasticity exists.
All covfe, 5 ), with fej, are assumed to be zero because (1) two different takeover
announcements in the sample tend to occur at different calendar times, and (2 ) without
any assumptions, Y is impossible to estimate given that there are (N+l)N/2 parameters
in

while there are only N observations (which is less than the number of parameters in

* ).

If the test rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, weighted least squares
procedure is employed to obtain the best linear unbiased estimator of the coefficients.
That is, both dependent and independent variables are scaled by the standard error of
estimation period residuals obtained from the market model.
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